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I. INTRODUCTION
Many indigenous and local communitiest object to the way their
communally developed agricultural strains, folklore, and traditional
medicines-their "traditional knowledge"-serve as free building blocks for
the patents and copyrights of outsiders, often without any recognition,
compensation, or control over the way this information is used. Traditional
knowledge provides certain multibillion dollar industries, including
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and agriculture, with useful leads for product
discovery and development. 2 Intellectual property law readily recognizes these
industries' "innovations." But it often turns a blind eye to the incremental and
seemingly unscientific contributions of traditional knowledge holders, who are
some of the world's poorest people.
Consider the following hypothetical: for generations, members of an
indigenous group in Madagascar have consumed the leaf of a local plant for
various medicinal purposes, including the relief of indigestion. A Western
researcher working on behalf of a pharmaceutical company visits the area to
gather information about the uses of local plants. He stays for several months,
trying to establish a relationship with members of the group, particularly those
identified as healers or medicine men. Initially, they are wary of sharing their
knowledge, but the researcher persuades them of his trustworthiness. He is
1. The phrase "indigenous and local communities" is widely used in the existing scholarly
literature on traditional knowledge (TK), as well as in national and international laws concerning TK.
Neither the term "indigenous" nor "local community" has a precise, internationally agreed-upon
definition. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples and Community
Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 275, 277 (2001) (discussing the
ambiguity of these terms); Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous People" in International Law: A
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414, 415 (1998) (discussing the
lack of an agreed meaning for "indigenous people"). For the purposes of this Article, I use the phrase
"indigenous and local communities" in a manner similar to scholars' use of the term "long-term
occupant communities," to
include those groups that have been variously described as First Nations or Native
Americans, as well as aboriginal, indigenous, and tribal populations, peoples, or
communities . . . [and] socio-cultural groups that may not fall easily under existing
definitions of "indigenous" or "tribal" peoples, but which nonetheless have lived for long
periods of time in particular areas and often depend upon the natural resources of those
locales for their livelihood and sustenance.
Gregory Maggio, Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments
for Conserving Biodiversity, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 179, 181-82 (1998); see also Paul J. Heald,
The Rhetoric ofBiopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519, 519 n.3 (2003).
2. Exact figures are unknown, but by some estimates, the annual global markets for products
in the healthcare, agriculture, horticulture, and biotechnology sectors derived from these resources lie
between $500 and $800 billion. See Kerry ten Kate & Sarah A. Laird, Bioprospecting Agreements and
Benefit Sharing with Local Communities, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 133, 134 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004). But
some commentators note the increasing shift toward other inputs. See, e.g., Graham Dutfield, Legal and
Economic Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 495, 505 (Keith E. Maskus &
Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS] ("[A]dvances in
biotechnology and new drug discovery approaches based, for example, on combinatorial chemistry,
genomics, and proteomics will in the long term reduce industrial interest in natural products and their
associated TK.").
[Vol. 36: 371372
2011] A Trade Secret Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge
allowed to observe the preparation of traditional medicines utilizing the leaf of
this plant. The researcher returns home to the company, taking samples and the
information he has learned. Company scientists subsequently isolate the active
chemical responsible for the plant's therapeutic effects, obtain U.S. and
European patents, and mass-produce a profitable drug that has fewer side-
effects than the plant consumed in raw form. The group receives no notice,
attribution, or compensation.
In response to the seeming inequity of this scenario and others,
indigenous and local communities, their advocates, and developing country
governments have, for over a decade, pressed for traditional knowledge
protection in the form of internationally recognized intellectual property rights.
But while the issue of traditional knowledge protection has elicited public
sympathy, meaningful international agreement has been difficult to achieve for
a number of reasons.
First, the term "traditional knowledge" lacks a clear definition and
encompasses a diverse body of information. Broadly, it refers to the
"agricultural, environmental, medicinal knowledge" of indigenous and local
communities, developed communally over generations.3 Examples include
knowledge of herbal remedies, plant-breeding techniques, and the suitability of
animal pelts for human clothing. Some commentators also use the term
traditional knowledge to include "traditional cultural expressions" (TCEs), such
as folklore, songs, and dances.4 In this Article, I use the term "traditional
knowledge" to refer primarily to agricultural, environmental, and medicinal
knowledge.
Second, indigenous and local communities differ in their relationships
with dominant cultures and their degrees of interest in commercializing or
profiting from traditional knowledge. Some regard Western conceptions of
property and the commodification of traditional knowledge with suspicion
(echoed in much of the scholarly literature), while others are eager to embrace
new forms of economic opportunity and recognition.
Third, the communal and intergenerational characteristics of traditional
knowledge pose theoretical and practical challenges for modern intellectual
property regimes. At a theoretical level, creating new sui generis rights or
3. In recent publications, the World Intellectual Property Organization's Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (WIPO
IGC) has used this fairly broad working definition:
[T]he know-how, skills, innovations, practices and learning that form part of traditional
knowledge systems, and knowledge embodying traditional lifestyles of indigenous and
local communities, or contained in codified knowledge systems passed between
generations. It is not limited to any specific technical field, and may include agricultural,
environmental and medicinal knowledge, and any traditional knowledge associated with
genetic resources.
World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. &
Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised
Objectives and Principles, at 27, 16th Sess., WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/16/5 (Jan. 22, 2010)
[hereinafter WIPO, Traditional Knowledge Objectives].
4. The WIPO IGC distinguishes between TK and traditional cultural expressions (TCEs). See
Traditional Cultural Expressions (Folklore), WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/folklore (last visited
Mar. 21, 2011).
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adapting existing laws to accommodate this subject matter does not mesh easily
with the prevailing justification for intellectual property rights: to provide
inventors and authors with ex ante incentives to create. Traditional knowledge
has, after all, been created for centuries without the carrot of an intellectual
property right. And given the unprecedented expansion of intellectual property
rights over the last three decades, even progressive intellectual property
scholars are skeptical of any further erosion of the public domain. At a
practical level, the challenges for those seeking traditional knowledge rights are
also daunting. For example, how does one identify the proper owners of rights
in traditional knowledge when the original creators are long deceased or when
multiple neighboring communities have similar healing practices or agricultural
knowledge?
Despite these challenges, traditional knowledge advocates have
articulated compelling reasons for increased protection. By and large,
advocates have worked outside of the economic incentives discourse that
dominates contemporary intellectual property theory. Viewing the conventional
intellectual property discourse as too narrow or too hostile to their concerns,
they have relied instead on the language of human rights, indigenous rights, and
biodiversity preservation. They have argued that enabling traditional
knowledge holders to control the uses and collect on the value of their
contributions may be critical to their economic and cultural survival, and it
encourages their maintenance of biodiversity that benefits the entire world.6
These preservation and human rights objectives are enshrined in a number
of international environmental and human rights instruments.7 But these treaties
are largely advisory in practice and lack the enforcement muscle of
international intellectual property agreements, notably the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),8 which is
linked to the World Trade Organization's dispute resolution system.9
Consequently, traditional knowledge advocates seek recognition and rights
within the TRIPS framework-even as they resist framing their arguments in
the language of IP.
This resistance has consequences, as it encourages scholars,
commentators, and developed country governments to dismiss traditional
knowledge protection as a well-meaning fringe issue better addressed outside
5. See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of
Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1103 (2009) (describing the dependence of indigenous survival on
groups' intangible property, which "may be the greatest commodifiable good they possess in a global
economy"); Rosemary J. Coombe, Protecting Traditional Environmental Knowledge and New Social
Movements in the Americas: Intellectual Property, Human Right, or Claims to an Alternative Form of
Sustainable Development?, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. I15, 115 (2005).
7. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 41, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1195 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS]. TRIPS requires all World Trade Organization (WTO) members to strengthen protection for
intellectual property and to provide the same treatment ("national treatment") for foreign owners. Id. art.
3.
9. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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the international IP framework. Deep differences between the purposes of
traditional knowledge protection and the existing IP framework also raise
concerns about the suitability of IP rights for traditional knowledge. Can such a
regime be workable and enforceable at the international level and still respond
to the concerns of traditional knowledge holders? To date, much of the
scholarly literature suggests that traditional knowledge protection is largely
incompatible with existing intellectual property doctrines and underlying
justifications.
In this Article, I argue that the doctrinal and normative divide between
traditional knowledge protection and intellectual property law has been
overemphasized, and that trade secret law can help narrow it. First, in terms of
doctrinal fit, trade secret doctrine offers a viable model for protecting a subset
of traditional knowledge that is not already publicly available. Broadly
speaking, trade secret law imposes liability for the wrongful acquisition, use, or
disclosure of valuable information that is the subject of reasonable secrecy
efforts. While various scholars have acknowledged trade secret law's potential
for traditional knowledge holders,' 0 its possibilities have yet to be examined in
sufficient depth.
Notably, trade secret law operates without patent law's stringent
requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and identifiable inventors, its
temporal constraints, and the expense of a patent application. And unlike other
categories of intellectual property, trade secret law may accommodate the
conflicting privacy and commercialization concerns of traditional knowledge
holders. That trade secret law applies only to relatively secret, as opposed to
publicly available, information may frustrate some traditional knowledge
holders-particularly those whose knowledge is already publicly available. But
a limiting principle of relative secrecy prevents traditional knowledge
protection from becoming an unbounded cause of action for any behavior by
outsiders that traditional knowledge holders deem objectionable. By contrast, a
broader misappropriation approach, which is currently under discussion at the
World Intellectual Property Organization's Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore (WIPO IGC), may pose such potential for overreach."
Second, in addition to its practical import, the underlying justifications of
trade secret law offer a useful normative guide for theorizing traditional
knowledge protection and linking it to the broader purposes of intellectual
property law. Trade secret law emerged from a complicated stew of rationales,
and scholars have struggled to understand how it advances the stated goals of
intellectual property law. As Mark Lemley has recently observed, however,
trade secret law serves the broader "disclosure" purposes of intellectual
10. See, e.g., Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 233, 259-60 (2001) ("Conceivably, a considerable amount of TK could be protected
under trade secret law."); Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORD-AM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929,
967 (2002) (noting that trade secret law "seem[s] adaptable to traditional knowledge"); Srividhya
Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 1, 20-22 (2001).
11. See infra notes 205-222 and accompanying text.
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property law.12 By regulating information sharing in certain minimally fair
ways, trade secret law can promote trust and efficient collaboration between
parties that would otherwise be too distrustful of one another to disclose
information.
This is a valuable insight for the traditional knowledge debate. Like trade
secret law more generally, the protection of traditional knowledge can serve the
broader purposes of intellectual property law by lessening holders' distrust in
negotiating with outsiders and encouraging the disclosure of valuable secret
information to more productive users (for example, to the drug company that
can create a medicine with fewer side effects and distribute it to wider
audiences). Anecdotal evidence suggests that absent traditional knowledge
protection, indigenous and local groups are becoming warier of sharing
information with outsiders who are in a position to improve and commercialize
it.13 In fact, they may go (and some have gone) to greater lengths to prevent the
flow of any information to outsiders-in one example, by banning the entry of
all outside researchers into their community.14
Thus, while the concerns illuminating the traditional knowledge debate
may be diverse, encompassing human and indigenous rights, cultural diversity,
and biodiversity preservation, traditional knowledge protection can nonetheless
further an important purpose of existing IP laws: to encourage disclosure and
information sharing on fair terms. In making this comparison to trade secret
law, I critique the oversimplified justification for modern intellectual property
law as providing incentives to create. Intellectual property law can and should
encourage parties of unequal economic power to collaborate and share
information on fair terms.
The Article unfolds in four parts. Part II sets the stage by defining
traditional knowledge and describing the cultural and political shifts that led to
its emergence as a subject of international controversy. Part III considers the
three predominant approaches commentators and scholars have taken to
understand and rationalize traditional knowledge protection-what I loosely
term the preservation approach, the human rights approach, and the
conventional IP approach. Parts IV and V revisit the conventional IP approach
and expand upon it by examining trade secret doctrine in depth. Part IV
assesses the merits and limitations of trade secret law for the protection of
traditional knowledge. And Part V considers how the "disclosure" justification
of trade secret law-and intellectual property law more broadly-can inform a
more compelling IP theory for traditional knowledge protection. Part VI
concludes.
12. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN.
L. REv. 311, 313-14 (2008).
13. See infra notes 247-250 and accompanying text.
14. Id.
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE DEBATE
A. Problematic Generalizations
One of the greatest challenges when assessing the need for international
protection of traditional knowledge or the form it might take is the sheer
diversity of indigenous group practices and organizations. Each group has
unique customary practices and different relationships with the dominant
culture and national government. 5 While any discussion of traditional
knowledge protection requires some definitional generalization, it is important
to clarify at the outset several misconceptions that often skew the terms of the
debate. These misconceptions include the nature of traditional knowledge-
holding societies, the "ownership" of knowledge within traditional societies,
and the extent to which traditional knowledge can be new and innovative. I
address them only briefly, as they are well documented in the literature.' 6
First, policymakers and commentators often embrace a narrow conception
of traditional knowledge holders as tribal populations that exist wholly outside
of the "cultural mainstream" of their respective countries and whose behaviors
have barely changed over time.' As Graham Dutfield rightly observes, we
must be wary of such a "fixed and dogmatic" conception of what traditional
knowledge holders look like. These groups are comprised not only of
"culturally distinct tribal people" but also of "traditional rural communities that
are not necessarily removed from the cultural mainstream of a country."' 9 Nor
is all traditional knowledge necessarily sacred to these communities.
The ayahuasca vine controversy is an illustrative example of the potential
skewing effects of overgeneralization. Ayahuasca-or "vine of the soul" in
Quechua-is a South American hallucinogenic plant that generations of native
Amazonian peoples have used for religious and other purposes. In the late
1980s, an American scientist patented a claimed "new" variety of ayahuasca,
based on samples he obtained from Ecuador. Years later, after the news worked
its way to tribal leaders, who were aggrieved by the patenting of a plant they
viewed as sacred, a federation of Amazonian Indians collaborating with
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) challenged the U.S. patent. They
argued that the invention not only lacked novelty, but also violated morality
because the plant was sacred to indigenous people.20 The ayahuasca example is
15. See Antony Taubman & Matthias Leistner, Traditional Knowledge, in INDIGENOUS
HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
FOLKLORE 59 (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2d ed. 2009).
16. See generally GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOGENETIC RESOURCES
AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 91-96 (2004) (discussing characteristics of traditional knowledge-
holding societies).
17. Id at 92.
18. Id. at 93.
19. Id
20. For descriptions of this controversy, see, for example, MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS
NATIVE CULTURE? 107-08 (2003); David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool To
Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253, 279-80 (2000); and Philip Schuler,
Biopiracy and Commercialization of Ethnobotanical Knowledge, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 2, at 169-70.
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often invoked to illustrate intellectual property's ultimate hostility to and
incompatibility with the unique anticommodification concerns of indigenous
groups.
Some traditional knowledge is, of course, so spiritually significant to
certain groups that they would oppose its commercialization under any
circumstances. But this is not the whole story. Traditional knowledge holders
are not a monolithic group with monolithic interests. Some, like the rural
Kerala farmer who seeks to patent a high-yield method for planting rubber
trees, or the indigenous Congolese artisan who aims to market her wares
abroad, may be eager to enhance the commercial value of their knowledge. 2 1
Other groups, like the Aguarana Indians of Peru or the Kani people of
Southwestern India, may not be thrilled by the idea of commercializing their
knowledge, but are even less thrilled by the idea of outsiders reaping all the
benefits once the "cat gets out of the bag." In that case, they may prefer the
"second best" solution of capturing a fair portion of the commercial profit.22
Adopting too rigid a conception of traditional knowledge holders can lead
policymakers and commentators to conflate these differing concerns and
interests.
Another common misconception concerns "ownership" of traditional
knowledge within these communities. Policymakers often assume that
knowledge is shared freely and that traditional communities are hostile to any
conceptions of "property" or "ownership." But while these communities may
be less individualistic, diversity exists here, too. Many traditional societies have
complex, local customary laws23 governing traditional knowledge, akin to
intellectual property. 24
And finally, one particularly troublesome misconception is that of
21. Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
97, 98 (2007); see also J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview to POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 2, at 1, 3 (describing several examples of "enhancing the commercial value of poor people's
knowledge in which there are no worries about this use being culturally offensive to members of the
community").
22. Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 YALE L.J. 991, 997 (2005); see
also BROWN, supra note 20, at 112-14 (describing the bioprospecting and benefit-sharing agreements
between a federation of Aguaruna Indians in Peru and Western pharmaceutical companies, and the
Indians' desire to "'find new formulas for collaborating with industry ... and opportunities to exploit
the economic value of [their] resources' (quoting Interview by Michael F. Brown with Sara Sara in
Lima, Peru (July 18, 2001)); Finger, supra note 21, at 20 (describing the fifty-fifty split of license and
royalty income between the Kani people of southwestern India and an Indian research institute in the
development of the drug Jeevani, which is based on the anti-fatigue properties of a wild plant known to
the Kani).
23. The term "local customary law" (or law governing a traditional community) is used here to
avoid confusion with the concept of international customary law (governing relations between states).
See Antony Taubman, Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudential Diversity in the International
Protection of Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 2, at 521, 555
(using that term).
24. For example, the community may be collectively responsible for maintaining resources,
but local customary law may recognize the special status of certain individuals (like healers or medicine
men) with respect to traditional knowledge. Such individuals may be recognized as informal creators or
inventors distinct from their community. Local customary law may also impose restrictions on the way
traditional knowledge is shared within the community and with outsiders. See, e.g., DUTFIELD, supra
note 16, at 95; Downes, supra note 20, at 258; Taubman & Leistner, supra note 15, at 77.
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traditional knowledge (TK) as old and unchanging-hence the "traditional"
moniker.25 Traditional knowledge is not merely handed down from generation
to generation, static and sealed in time. It evolves, improves, and is traditional
only in the sense that its creation and use comprise part of the cultural traditions
of a community.26 As commentators have noted, "TK has always been adaptive
because adaptation is the key to survival in precarious environments."
27
B. Traditional Knowledge Protection in the Global Limelight
In his influential book, Who Owns Native Culture, anthropologist Michael
Brown observed, "In the late 1980s ownership of knowledge and artistic
creations traceable to the world's indigenous societies emerged, seemingly out
of nowhere, as a major social issue."28 Yet it was not from nowhere that the
issue burst onto the international stage. Traditional knowledge's emergence as
an issue of global importance can be traced to at least two major political and
legal shifts: (1) the unprecedented expansion and internationalization of first-
world style intellectual property rights, most notably with the passage of
TRIPS; and (2) the increased global recognition of indigenous peoples' rights.
Other international agreements may have preceded it,29 but TRIPS
expanded, strengthened, and homogenized global intellectual property
standards in unprecedented ways.3 0  First, the high minimum standards
mandated by TRIPS curtailed much of the flexibility that countries previously
enjoyed in tailoring national intellectual property laws. Subject to limited
25. The misleading nature of the term "traditional" knowledge has led some commentators to
reject it. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities,
Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155,
164-66 (preferring the term "local knowledge"); Sunder, supra note 21 (preferring the term "poor
people's knowledge").
26. Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: A TRIPS-Compatible
Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 140-41.
27. DUTFIELD, supra note 10, at 95; see also Peter Drahos, A Networked Responsive
Regulatory Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE &
DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 385
(Daniel Gervais ed., 2007); Finger, supra note 21, at 35 (noting that traditional knowledge holders often
lack an understanding of the "commercial/legal tools needed to collect the value of their novelty");
Sunder, supra note 21, at 109-13 (listing examples).
28. BROWN, supra note 20, at ix.
29. See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of Mar 20, 1883, done
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works of Sept. 9, 1886, concluded July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Berne Convention].
30. For a description of the industry lobbying efforts that led to the passage of TRIPS, see
SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 96-120 (2003).
31. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 27. Prior to TRIPS, some countries such as India did not
recognize patents in pharmaceutical products, only pharmaceutical processes. This flexibility allowed
for a thriving generics industry. Several firms could produce the same drug, so long as they found an
alternate way of producing it. TRIPS eliminated such flexibility by requiring patents to be available for
"any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology," subject only to limited
exceptions. In terms of required standards, TRIPS is a floor, not a ceiling. But under the national
treatment principle of TRIPS, if a country does provide stronger intellectual property to its own citizens,
it must generally extend those same rights to the citizens of other member countries. For a description of
patent protection variation among countries prior to TRIPS, see generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
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exceptions, countries must make patents available "for any invention, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology," including pharmaceuticals,
modified micro-organisms, and microbiological processes (such as those used
in biotechnology), "provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and
are capable of industrial application." Moreover, while countries can exclude
from their patent laws "plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and
essentially biological processes," they must protect plant varieties. 32
The controversial protection of plant varieties and bioengineered goods is
particularly relevant to the emergence of traditional knowledge protection as a
hot global topic.33 Several countries oppose patents on any life forms, man-
made or otherwise, and resent the TRIPS requirement that such patents be
recognized.34 Controversial U.S. and European patents on inventions derived
from developing country genetic resources and traditional knowledge-such as
patents for neem-based pesticides-further fueled the fires.35 These widely
publicized cases led advocates for indigenous groups, local farmers, and
developing country governments to coin the term "biopiracy."36 This term
describes the industrial practice of patenting products based on traditional
knowledge or genetic resources, without providing compensation or
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 354 (2d ed. 2008).
32. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 27(3)(b) (requiring protection "either by patents or by an
effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof').
33. See Dutfield, supra note 16, at 260 (describing the convergence of "biodiplomacy and
intellectual property diplomacy" as a result of this requirement). The genesis of the requirement that
patents be extended to bioengineered goods-an explicit nod to the biotechnology sector--can be traced
to the controversial decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), in which the U.S.
Supreme Court permitted the patenting of a genetically engineered, oil-eating microbe, as well as earlier
cases that allowed the patenting of isolated and purified chemical compounds, see, e.g., Merck & Co. v.
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958) (upholding a patent on purified Vitamin
B-12). Following Chakrabarty, inventors have obtained patents on "anything under the sun that is made
by man," Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309, from isolated genetic sequences to modified plants and animals.
See Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time ofBiotechnological Promise: The International Conflict
To Control the Building Blocks ofLife, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 645-46 (2004).
34. Even in the United States, the seemingly limitless scope of biotechnology patents are
contested, as exemplified by a recent district court decision invalidating patents held by Myriad Genetics
on genes linked to breast and ovarian cancer. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Cancer
Genes Cannot Be Patented, U.S. Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at B l.
35. In the case of neem, a type of tree native to South and Southeast Asia, the specialty
chemicals company W.R. Grace obtained U.S. and European patents on pesticides derived from neem
extracts. For centuries, Indian farmers have used a mixture of soaked neem seeds and alcohol as a
pesticide. Grace's patents covered processes that increased the shelf life and storage of azadirachtin, an
active agent in neem; the company claimed their patents were improvements on the traditional process
because the neem mixture used by farmers begins to degrade if not used within a few days. A number of
advocacy groups challenged these patents in 1995, arguing that Grace's extraction process did not
sufficiently differ from the traditional process. In 2000, the European Patent Office revoked Grace's
patent on grounds that it was not novel, but the U.S. patent remains valid. The U.S. neem example
demonstrates the difficulty of challenging patents for products or processes derived from traditional
knowledge and genetic resources through chemical isolation or a genetic engineering process, because
of the way novelty is assessed under U.S. patent law. For discussions of the neem and other "biopiracy"
controversies, see, for example, Shubha Ghosh, Traditional Knowledge, Patents, and the New
Mercantilism (Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 885 (2003); and Schuler, supra note 20, at
159, 161-76.
36. See Dutfield, supra note 10, at 237 (describing the coinage of the term as "part of a
counterattack strategy on behalf of developing countries").
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recognition to source countries or communities.3 7
Not only does TRIPS homogenize and strengthen minimum standards in
unprecedented ways, but its formidable enforcement mechanism also stands in
stark contrast to previous international intellectual property instruments. Unlike
other agreements, "TRIPS has teeth."38 Because it is linked to the WTO's
dispute resolution system, member states must comply and submit to
mandatory adjudication of disputes initiated by member governments or risk
retaliatory trade sanctions.3 9 Developing countries agreed to the draconian
conditions imposed by TRIPS in exchange for favorable trade treatment and the
promise of foreign direct investment.4 0 The troubling politics of TRIPS, and its
linkage to the WTO enforcement mechanism, have triggered numerous,
trenchant critiques, which I will not recreate here.41
Around the same time that TRIPS began to shake the international IP
landscape, indigenous groups began to demand increased recognition of and
control over their culture and traditional knowledge. Over the past few decades,
indigenous groups have become more politically salient. They cooperate
globally on a variety of common issues, including the protection of indigenous
resources and knowledge from appropriation. 4 2 Due in no small part to their
37. See, e.g., id.; Vandana Shiva, Bioprospecting as Sophisticated Biopiracy, 32 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 307 (2007). Vandana Shiva is one of the most prominent critics of
"biopiracy." Some commentators have criticized the term for oversimplifying the inequity or resting on
an imprecise understanding of intellectual property concepts, such as novelty. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho,
Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration ofSocio-Cultural Conflicts with Global Patent Policies, 39 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 433, 450 (2006).
38. Lawrence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2004).
39. See id. (describing the WTO's dispute settlement system). Only member governments can
initiate dispute settlement proceedings in the WTO; private individuals, companies, and NGOs do not
have direct access to the dispute settlement system. But these nongovernment entities can and often do
pressure WTO member governments to bring disputes where another member violates their obligations.
And several WTO member governments have "formally adopted internal legislation under which private
parties can petition their governments to bring a WTO dispute." Introduction to the WTO Dispute
Resolution System, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu.e/disp_settlement cbte/c ls4pl
e.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011); see also Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations ofIntellectual
Property: Narratives ofDeveloping Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7
SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315, 337 (2003) (describing TRIPS's minimum obligations for remedies,
administrative and judicial processes, and border controls).
40. For a more nuanced view of the politics of TRIPS, see Amy Kapczynski, The Access to
Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 848 (2008)
(explaining that the "success of TRIPS required not just pressure and transfer payments, but also
interventions in the realm of ideas" in order to "produce the acquiescence of developing countries"
i.e., the industry lobby "made the case that TRIPS was not only good for American business, but also
good for global innovation, and for developing countries specifically").
41. In brief, strong Western-style IP rights disproportionately benefit developed countries,
stifle the further development of countries that have not passed a certain threshold of development, and
pose serious risks to global health by raising the costs of needed medicines. See Okediji, supra note 39,
at 340-41 (describing some of the numerous critiques). Such critiques continue even after the passage of
TRIPS, as the United States, Europe, and Japan negotiate TRIPS-plus bilateral agreements that impose
even stricter minimum requirements, and as the United States and other countries negotiate the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a treaty that would establish further strengthening of IP in the
realm of counterfeit goods. For the first public draft of ACTA, see Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(Apr. 2010) (public predecisional/deliberative draft), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf.
42. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Subcomm. on Human Rights, Written Statements
Submitted by International Indian Treaty Council 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/2003/NGO/127 (Mar. 17, 2003);
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efforts, the U.N. General Assembly drafted and adopted the Declaration of the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIPS).43 With respect to traditional
knowledge, the Declaration recognizes the rights of "indigenous peoples ... to
maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions," as well as "their intellectual
property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional
cultural expressions.""
C. Forms ofIP and the Limits of "Positive" and "Defensive"
Protection
What do traditional knowledge holders want in terms of protection? As
previously noted, the variations among and between indigenous and local
communities complicate this question. The meaning of meaningful protection
depends on whether groups are more concerned with finding opportunities to
benefit from commercialization or with curbing the cultural, social, and
psychological harm from another's unauthorized use. Even within a particular
group, both concerns may be present, depending on whether the traditional
knowledge at issue is of a secular or sacred nature. Generally, commentators
discuss traditional knowledge protection in terms of two broad categories:
"defensive" protection and "positive" (or "offensive") protection.45
Defensive protection is often described as the protection of traditional
knowledge against outsiders' acquisition of intellectual property rights based
on traditional knowledge. Defensive protection measures tend to focus on the
patent system. Attempts to invalidate the ayahuasca and neem-related patents
46are examples of defensive protection. Another common defensive measure is
the creation of traditional knowledge databases, to which patent examiners can
refer when assessing relevant prior art.47
By contrast, positive (or offensive) protection is the protection of
see also Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights in
Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 51 (2009) ("Indigenous peoples increasingly
cooperate globally on a range of shared issues, such as land tenure and language preservation."). For
example, it was an organization representing indigenous groups that first uncovered and challenged the
U.S. patent relating to the ayahuasca vine. See Ho, supra note 37, at 451 & n.65; see also Kapczynski,
supra note 40, at 825-28 (discussing the efforts of farmers' rights advocates to build an international
campaign against neem-related patents).
43. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter DRIPS], available at http://www.un.org/esalsocdev/
umpfiildocuments/DRIPS_en.pdf. In the mid-1990s, the United Nations seriously began to address
indigenous rights and commissioned a working group and a special rapporteur to create a Draft
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the
Heritage of Indigenous People in 1994. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Subcomm. on Prevention
of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.l (1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration]; Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual
Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 143, 147 (2001).
44. DRIPS, supra note 43, art. 31(1).
45. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, BOOKLET NO. 2, at
I1-12 (2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/tk/920/wipo_pub_920.pdf
46. Id. at 21-22, 26.
47. See infra Subsection II.C.2.
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traditional knowledge by intellectual property rightS48 -for example, the
holder's acquisition of an existing intellectual property right, an adapted IP
right specifically focused on traditional knowledge, or a new sui generis right
in traditional knowledge.4 9 Though much has been made of the distinction
between these two categories of protection, they blur in practice.o Both
categories pose certain obstacles for traditional knowledge holders, discussed
below.
1. Positive Protection and the Hurdles ofPatent and Copyright
Traditional knowledge is often assessed through the lens of patent law,
insofar as it concerns traditional medicinal or agricultural practice. It otherwise
is assessed through the lens of copyright law, insofar as it concerns traditional
cultural expressions, such as folklore or native artwork. These IP forms are
generally inhospitable to traditional knowledge holders.
Governments award patents for certain inventions and discoveries that are
new, useful, and nonobvious in light of the previous knowledge (or "prior art")
for a set period of time (usually twenty years from the date of application). In
addition, patent applications must describe the invention in enough detail to
enable others skilled in the art to make it-the "enablement" requirement.5t
Copyright protects original forms of expression, such as novels, musical
compositions, and artwork, for a longer but still set period of time. In addition,
many countries, including the United States, require copyrightable material to
52
be fixed in a tangible medium-the "fixation" requirement. When the term of
protection for a patent or copyright ends, the protected work or creation enters
the public domain, to be more or less "freely" used by others.53
Certain characteristics of traditional knowledge make patent or copyright
protection unlikely. 54 For example, since patents and copyrights are temporally
48. Coenraad J. Visser, Making Intellectual Property Laws Work for Traditional Knowledge,
in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2, at 207, 212.
49. Dutfield, supra note 2, at 497; WIPO, supra note 45, at 17.
50. Obtaining positive protection may be contingent on effective defensive protection-i.e.,
preventing outsiders from obtaining IP rights based on the same traditional knowledge. Visser, supra
note 48, at 212. And positive protection may be necessary where mere defensive protection measures,
like traditional knowledge databases, are insufficient to deter outsiders' use. As the WIPO IGC has
observed, defensive protection measures are not directed at preventing outsiders from using traditional
knowledge without permission; they only prevent them from obtaining IP rights, like patents, based on
traditional knowledge. WIPO Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. & Genetic Res.,
Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, Practical Mechanisms for the Defensive Protection of Traditional
Knowledge and Genetic Resources within the Patent System, at 2, 5th Sess., WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTK/IC/5/6 (May 14, 2003).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Fixation is not, however, a universal requirement. The Berne
Convention explicitly provides that it is the decision of individual countries "to prescribe that works ...
shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material form." Berne Convention, supra note
29, art. 2(2).
53. The public domain is a complicated concept. IP scholars offer various understandings of
the public domain. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on
Public Domains, 55 DuKE L.J. 783 (2006).
54. Despite the limitations of patent and copyright laws in addressing the unique temporal,
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limited, long-standing traditional knowledge usually won't qualify for
protection. Instead, modem IP laws consider it part of the public domain.55
Also, substances found in nature that do not involve some kind of technical
intervention are typically excluded from the subject matter of patent.56
Moreover, the unwritten nature of traditional knowledge conflicts with patent's
"enablement" and copyright's "fixation" requirements.57 And while patent
applications must identify the actual inventor or groups of inventors responsible
for creating the invention, the communal and incremental development of
traditional knowledge often makes it difficult or even impossible to identify
specific creators within the community. Finally, the prohibitive up-front
expense of acquiring a patent is a significant practical limitation for traditional
knowledge holders.
In comparison to patent and copyright, other categories of intellectual
property, such as trademark,60 geographical indications (GIs), and trade
secret,62 seem more promising to traditional knowledge holders. These forms of
intellectual property do not, for example, have a set term of protection; they are
potentially indefinite. And they are certainly cheaper to obtain than patents. But
trademarks and GIs can only protect the words and symbols associated with
oral, and communal aspects of TK, they have been used successfully, in some cases, to secure offensive
protection. See WIPO, supra note 45, at 18-20.
55. Not surprisingly, many traditional knowledge holders object to the application of the
"public domain" concept to traditional knowledge. See Taubman, supra note 23, at 544.
56. For a discussion of this distinction, see Safrin, supra note 33, at 645 ("Patents will not be
granted for genetic material as found in nature, such as a gene while in a plant or a fish. A patent,
however, can be obtained when that gene has been removed and isolated, and a useful function for it
identified. An isolated and purified gene does not exist in that form in nature.").
57. The oral nature of traditional knowledge not only prevents it from being patentable (or
copyrightable), but U.S. patent law does not recognize unpublished foreign "prior art." Thus, even
unpublished traditional knowledge that is widely known and used in a foreign country cannot invalidate
a U.S. patent. By contrast, prior unpublished domestic use can constitute prior art in the United States, a
geographic disparity that does not exist in the European Union, where foreign knowledge need not be
published to constitute prior art. This disparity has triggered calls for reform. See, e.g., Margo A.
Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87
MINN. L. REv. 679, 729-36 (2003).
58. See Dutfield, supra note 10, at 242-43; Gervais, supra note 26, at 141. The problem of
identification is compounded where multiple indigenous communities use the same traditional
knowledge. Such practical difficulties, though significant, should not be overstated. As Daniel Gervais
has argued, "[C]ollective ownership of marks is well accepted," so why should patents or copyrights be
any different? Gervais, supra note 26, at 149; see also id. ("Collective or communal ownership [of TK]
is recognized in several land-related treaties .... ).
59. See, e.g., Dutfield, supra note 10, at 255-56 (estimating that in the United States, "it costs
about $20,000 to prepare and prosecute a patent application, including legal and filing fees").
60. Trademark law protects registered words or symbols that help consumers identify the firm
that produces a product. WTO members are expected to provide for registration of trademarks, and the
owner of a registered trademark can prevent third parties from using similar signs that are likely to cause
consumer confusion. TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 15-16.
61. GIs provide trademark-like protection to distinctive goods, usually agricultural products or
foodstuffs, whose quality and reputation stem from the geographical area in which they are produced-
e.g., "Champagne." TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 22-23. Because GIs are by definition "descriptive," they
would not merit ordinary trademark protection. Like TK, the protection of GIs is a topic of controversy.
See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle over Geographic Indications, 18
EUR. J. INT'L L. 337 (2007).
62. Trade secret law, discussed in greater depth in Parts IV and V, protects a wide range of
potentially commercially valuable information that entities attempt to keep secret. See infra notes 124-
138 and accompanying text.
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traditional knowledge, not the use of the knowledge itself. For this reason, they
may be of limited relevance for some indigenous and local communities.63
2. Traditional Knowledge Databases and the Limitations of
Defensive Protection
Defensive protection efforts have largely focused on creating databases of
traditional knowledge to increase the likelihood that patent examiners will
locate and consider traditional knowledge during "prior art" searches.6
National governments and NGOs are spearheading a wide range of
documentation efforts. Notably, the Indian government has developed a
Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL), containing approximately
thirty million pages of Indian traditional knowledge and translated in five
languages.65
But for many traditional knowledge holders, disclosure of traditional
knowledge in publicly available databases is a double-edged sword. By making
otherwise secret or inaccessible knowledge public, this form of defensive
protection can actually facilitate the unauthorized use of traditional knowledge
that the community wishes to prevent. For example, let's say an indigenous
group provides information to the TDKL regarding a plant's ability to relieve
indigestion. Now suppose an outsider learns of this hitherto unknown or
inaccessible information, isolates the active compound responsible, and creates
a new drug that does not exist in nature and has fewer side effects than other
drugs on the market. If it is novel, useful, nonobvious, and adequately
described, the new drug is patentable. Documentation can thus have the
perverse effect of "tipping off outsiders to knowledge that will ultimately aid
them." 66
63. See Downes, supra note 20, at 269-70. But to the extent that there are traditional signs,
symbols, and terms associated with TK, some local communities have used trademarks, certification
marks, and GI laws successfully to protect against unauthorized use. For example, the Seri people of
Mexico, facing competition from mass production, registered the Arte Seri trademark to protect
authentic ironwood products produced by traditional methods from an indigenous species of tree, the
Olneya testota tree. See WIPO, supra note 45, at 19. And commentators increasingly point to GIs in
particular as a potential tool for indigenous and local communities seeking to profit from their traditional
knowledge. See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 21, at 114 (describing GIs as "poor people's intellectual
property rights").
64. See, e.g., WIPO, supra note 45, at 27; Taubman & Leistner, supra note 15, at 85-87. In
addition to this "practical aspect," defensive protection also has a "legal aspect"-for example,
reforming patent laws to consider unpublished traditional knowledge as relevant prior art. See WIPO,
supra note 45, at 27.
65. See Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 52; About TKDL, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Abouttkdl.asp?GL=Eng (last visited
Apr. 30, 2011). The TKDL is arranged according to the International Patent Classification so as to be
easily searchable by patent examiners looking for invalidating prior art. Munzer & Raustiala, supra note
42, at 52.
66. WIPO Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional
Knowledge & Folklore, supra note 50, at 2. But where national documentation efforts focus on
"common knowledge" throughout the region-for example, the Ayurveda system of traditional
medicine-there is less concern of this sort. See id.
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III. THREE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
PROTECTION
Several international conventions and agreements address the subject of
traditional knowledge, 67 including the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD),68 the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (ITPGR),6 9 the aforementioned U.N. DRIPS, 70 and the U.N.
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention for
the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage.7' In addition, the WIPO IGC
received its "strongest mandate to date" in the fall of 2009 to develop an
international legal instrument to ensure the effective protection of traditional
knowledge, genetic resources, and traditional cultural expressions by 2011.72
67. The "density" of rules and institutions that touch on the subject of traditional knowledge is
emblematic of international IP rulemaking more generally. See, e.g., Lawrence Helfer, Toward a Human
Rights Framework for IP, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 980-81 (2007) (describing the shift from a
unimodal phase of IP rulemaking to the modem 'regime complex'-a multi-issue, multi-venue, mega-
regime in which governments and NGOs shift norm creating initiatives from one venue to another");
Kal Raustiala, Commentary: Density and Conflict in International IP Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021,
1023 (2007) (describing the "increasingly dense system of international institutions, and rising
competition and conflict among differing rules and institutions").
68. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD];
see also infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text (discussing the CBD's approach to protecting
traditional knowledge in detail).
69. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, opened for
signature Nov. 3, 2001 [hereinafter ITPGR] (entered into force June 29, 2004), available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/0ll/iO5lOe/i0510e.pdf. Also referred to as the International Seed Treaty or
the Farmers Rights Treaty, the ITPGR requires member states to take measures to protect and promote
farmers' rights, which the Food and Agriculture Organization defines as "rights arising from the past,
present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic
resources, particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity." Food & Agric. Org. [FAO], Farmers'
Rights, FAO Res. 5/89 (Nov. 29, 1989), available at http://www.farmersrights.org/about/fr-history
part4.html; see also KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS: CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 126-27 (2008) (describing the impact of the CBD and
ITPGR).
70. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
71. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage art. 1, Oct. 17, 2003,
2368 U.N.T.S. 35, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf. The 2003
UNESCO Convention seeks to "safeguard the intangible cultural heritage," "ensure respect" and
appreciation for these materials, "raise awareness" of their importance, and "provide for international
cooperation and assistance." Id. at 36. Prior to this Convention, the term "cultural heritage" typically
focused on tangible objects, such as cultural relics. Intangible cultural heritage encompasses traditional
knowledge and folklore. This Convention, as well as the 2005 Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 269, available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf, are more aspirational than obligatory. For
a discussion of these conventions, see Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM
L. REv. 2004, 2013-14 (2007); and Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible
Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 434-35 (2009).
72. Press Release, WIPO, International Conference Calls for Concrete Outcomes on TK, GRs,
& TCEs, Press Release No. PR/2009/Gl6 (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/
pressroom/enlarticles/2009/article_0049.html; WIPO General Assembly, Matters Concerning the
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge,
and Folklore, 38th Sess., WIPO Doc. WO/GA/38/9 (Aug. 15, 2009). This text is to be based on existing
WIPO documents, with three documents providing the basis for the committee's work on genetic
resources, TCEs and TK, respectively: WIPO Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. & Genetic
Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, Genetic Resources: List of Options, 9th Sess., WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/ 11/8A (June 3, 2007); WIPO Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. &
Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, The Protection of Traditional Cultural
Expressions/Expressions of Folklore: Revised Objectives and Principles, 9th Sess., WIPO Doc.
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Efforts in each of these venues are grounded in different theoretical
approaches to the question of why traditional knowledge should be protected,
and they focus on a different set of concerns. On the one hand, IP mechanisms
may be thought of as one device in a toolkit to reach any number of concerns-
be they concerns stemming from human rights, indigenous rights, cultural
heritage preservation, or biodiversity conservation. On the other hand, deep
differences between the purposes of conventional intellectual property rights
regimes and traditional knowledge protection are troubling. They raise doubts
about the viability of IP rights in traditional knowledge and their prospects for
actually addressing the concerns of traditional knowledge holders.
The existing attempts of advocates, commentators, and scholars to
understand and assess the legitimacy of traditional knowledge protection may
usefully be put into three (somewhat oversimplified) categories: the
preservation approach, the human rights approach, and the conventional IP
approach. In this Part, I survey these approaches. Each approach offers
important contributions and invites a different set of criticisms. The
preservation approach faces certain practical limitations and is troubling in its
emphasis on state control of genetic resources (and associated traditional
knowledge). The human rights approach to traditional knowledge protection is,
at least thus far, likely too expansive and uncertain to be practicable. The
conventional IP approach to traditional knowledge is both underdeveloped and
underappreciated-issues that Parts IV and V examine in further depth.
A. The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Preservation
Approach
The preservation approach frames traditional knowledge protection
through the lens of biodiversity preservation. This approach has, more than any
other, succeeding in triggering international and national action with respect to
traditional knowledge protection.74 The CBD was adopted in 1992 in response
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4 (Jan. 9, 2006); WIPO, Traditional Knowledge Objectives, supra note 3. The
forthcoming WIPO instrument is the subject of ongoing disagreement and discussion; for example, it is
still unclear whether the agreement, or any of its provisions, will be legally binding. See Kaitlin Maira,
WIPO Traditional Knowledge Committee Moving Toward Legal Agreement, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(May 7, 2010), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/05/07/wipo-traditional-knowledge-comnittee-
moving-toward-legal-agreement. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between the WTO and
WIPO, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Property
System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REv. 1187, 1193-97 (2009)
(noting that the relationship between the two organizations is "opaque" and that it is unclear whether
new developments within WIPO will affect WTO obligations).
73. Cf Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1125, 1129
(2000) (making similar observations in assessing the desirability of granting intellectual property rights
in individuals' personal data).
74. In its preamble, the CBD recognizes the "close and traditional dependence of many
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources, and the
desirability of sharing equitably benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations and
practices relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components."
CBD, supra note 68, pmbl. Article 8 of the CBD requires parties, "as far as possible and as appropriate"
and "subject to its national legislation," to "respect, preserve and maintain" traditional knowledge that is
"relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote [its] wider
application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge . . . and encourage the
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to growing concern over the depletion of the world's biological diversity. As of
March 2011, 193 countries were party to the CBD.75 The United States has
signed the Agreement but has not ratified it.76
Following the CBD, a number of developing countries enacted laws
regulating access to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge
within national borders-for example, requiring prior informed consent (of the
government in addition to, or in lieu of, the relevant community) and benefit
sharing.77 But generally, the effect of these provisions does not extend beyond
national borders. Thus, for example, while the South African government can
prosecute access violations that occur within the country, it can do little to
restrain corporate behavior that takes place entirely outside the country.78
Moreover, where access regimes require the permission of multiple and hard-
to-identify stakeholders, they may unintentionally lead to an "anticommons." 79
Thus, "[r]ather than engendering impressive economic gains" for developing
countries and indigenous groups, the CBD and the national access laws it
inspired may be "driving companies away from bioprospecting activities"
altogether.80
Commentators have also expressed concern that the CBD "frames
traditional knowledge and biological resources through the lens of state
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge." Id art. 8.
75. List ofParties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/infornation/
parties.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
76. See, e.g., Coombe, supra note 21, at 276; Dutfield, supra note 10, at 260.
77. For a description of various countries' CBD-inspired access legislation, see WIPO
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore,
Composite Study on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 5th Sess., at 33-40, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/8 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo
grtkf ic 5/wipogrtkf ic_5_8.pdf; and Taubman & Leistner, supra note 15, at 144-45. Prior informed
consent provisions are, in effect, property rules that permit traditional knowledge holders to deny others
access to the protected resource unless they find the terms acceptable. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi
Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331, 1364-66 (2004) (discussing
national access laws).
78. Strict (and sometimes, unpredictable) access regulations can also have the unintended
consequence of directing firms toward alternate ways of obtaining the same resources-e.g., from
suppliers in countries where the rules governing access and use are less onerous or nonexistent. A recent
example illustrates some of these difficulties with the existing CBD-inspired framework. Nestle faces
allegations of biopiracy for its use of two native South African plants, rooibus and honeybush, without
having obtained the government's permission, a requirement of the South African Biodiversity Act,
implemented pursuant to the CBD. See Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (S. Afr.). A Nestle subsidiary filed
several international patent applications to treat various hair and skin conditions based on these plant
extracts. Nestle contends that it neither obtained the plants in South Africa nor did research on them in
that country; instead, the plants were obtained from South African suppliers in Switzerland and France
and researched there. The CBD's rules governing the ownership of ex situ resources (i.e., resources no
longer in their country of origin) are far from clear, and the issue is a matter of ongoing international
discussion. See Food Giant Nestle Accused of Biopiracy, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., June 2,
2010, at 8-9, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweeklyl4-20.pdf.
79. As Michael Heller explains, an "anticommons" arises when too many entities have rights
to exclude others from a resource, which can lead to waste or underconsumption of the resource. See
Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill
HARv. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).
80. Safrin, supra note 33, at 655-57 (describing the 2001 collapse of a bioprospecting project
in Chiapas, Mexico aimed at drug discovery from plants widely used by the highland Maya after "nearly
two years trying to obtain the prior informed consent" of all the relevant groups, including
"approximately eight thousand villages and some nine hundred thousand Mayan-speaking people").
2011] A Trade Secret Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge 389
sovereignty, and vests ownership of these resources in the state," which might
have drastically different priorities with respect to these resources than
indigenous groups. Because the CBD recognizes states' sovereign rights over
the genetic resources within their borders, and given the close relationship
between genetic resources and traditional knowledge, do states have, in effect,
control over traditional knowledge? 82 Where true, that is problematic, as some
of the worst examples of indigenous group marginalization have come at the
hands of the national governments. 83 And it raises the question of who, in
practical terms, is the beneficiary of the CBD's preservation ethic-indigenous
groups or the developing country governments that may or may not advance
their interests?
B. The Human Rights Approach and Its Uncertain Intersection with IP
The human rights approach to traditional knowledge touts the "primacy"
of human rights obligations over other economic policies and agreements. 84 But
it is unclear what this "primacy" means (or should mean) when it comes to
using (or constraining) intellectual property mechanisms to protect traditional
knowledge. As commentators have observed, international human rights law
has an ambivalent and undertheorized relationship with intellectual property
law.
International human rights law and intellectual property law evolved
independently for much of their history. But as human rights regimes and
intellectual property regimes have each expanded, so have the intersections
between them.85 Laurence Helfer describes the emergence of this trend in the
1990s, when U.N. human rights bodies acknowledged indigenous groups'
81. Rebecca M. Bratspies, The New Discovery Doctrine: Some Thoughts on Property Rights
and Traditional Knowledge, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 315, 328 (2007); see also id. at 329-31 ("While
state ownership can give states the needed leverage to protect traditional knowledge, state ownership can
also hasten the dispossession of indigenous groups as states clamor for foreign investment." (footnote
omitted)). Article 15 of the CBD emphasizes the "sovereign rights of States over their natural
resources," including biological and genetic resources, which many regard as a departure from the prior
view of genetic resources as belonging to the common heritage of mankind. CBD, supra note 68, art. 15.
For a critique of this move to sovereign ownership of genetic resources, see Safrin, supra note 33, at 658
(describing the risk posed to the "autonomy and interests" of indigenous groups).
82. India's legislation restricting access to genetic material makes this conflation explicit. It
broadly prohibits foreign persons or corporations from "obtain[ing] any biological resource occurring in
India or knowledge associated thereto" for research, survey, or commercial utilization without the prior
approval of India's National Biodiversity Authority. The Biological Diversity Act § 3(1), No. 18 of
2003, INDIA CODE (emphasis added), availahle at http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/biodiv/actIbiodiv
act 2002.pdf. The law also authorizes the National Biodiversity Authority to secure equitable benefit
sharing for use of "accessed biological resources, their by-products . . . and knowledge relating thereto."
Id. § 2 1(1) (emphasis added).
83. See Drahos, supra note 27, at 393.
84. Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights
Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1092-93 (2007); see also Ho, supra note 37, at 476-77
(describing U.N. documents that address biopiracy concerns and emphasize the "primacy" of human
rights obligations "over competing economic policies and agreements").
85. While international IP treaties emerged in the late nineteenth century, the international
human rights regime only began in the post-World War II era. See LAWRENCE HELFER & GRAEME W.
AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE, at xi-xii
(2011).
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rights to recognition of and control over their culture, including traditional
knowledge.8 6
The Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples87 and the
Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous
People (and later, the finalized Declaration89) recognized indigenous groups'
broad rights to protect and control traditional knowledge. But, as Helfer
observes, these documents embody a "decidedly skeptical approach to
intellectual property protection": "[A] human rights-inspired analysis of
traditional knowledge views intellectual property as one of the problems facing
indigenous communities, and, only perhaps, as part of a solution to these
problems." 90
More broadly, the increasingly apparent intersection between human
rights rhetoric, rules, and institutions and intellectual property has triggered
various concerns. For starters, the two communities seem to speak "very
different languages": while intellectual property commentators tend to focus on
the economic "trade-offs between incentives and access," human rights
commentators "engage in a discourse of absolutes," emphasizing "categorical
rights and responsibilities."91 Another concern is that absent a clearer
understanding of human rights law's engagement with intellectual property
issues, actors on both sides of the intellectual property divide will simply
invoke human rights rhetoric to bolster arguments for strengthening or
weakening IP standards in treaties and national laws.92 Absent "greater
normative clarity . . . such 'rights talk' risks creating a legal environment in
which every claim (and therefore no claim) enjoys the distinctive protections
that attach to human rights."93
86. Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 971, 982 (2007).
87. Draft Declaration, supra note 43.
88. Special Rapporteur of the Subcomm. on the Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Minorities, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26, Annex (June 21, 1995) (by Erica-Irene Daes).
89. DRIPS, supra note 43.
90. Helfer, supra note 67, at 983-84. ("On the one hand, the documents urge states to protect
traditional knowledge using legal mechanisms that fit comfortably within existing intellectual property
paradigms-such as allowing indigenous communities to seek injunctions and damages for unauthorized
uses. But the documents also define protectable subject matter more broadly than existing intellectual
property laws, and they urge states to deny patents, copyrights, and other exclusive rights over 'any
element of indigenous peoples' heritage' that does not provide for 'sharing of ownership, control, use
and benefits' with those peoples.").
91. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 85, at 504-05.
92. See Yu, supra note 84.
93. Helfer, supra note 67, at 976; see also HELFER & AUSTIN supra note 85, at 512-21
(describing in detail their human rights framework for IP); id. at 521 (suggesting that "[a]ll other things
equal, ... governments should favor measures compatible with the existing intellectual property regime
over measures that are inconsistent with it," unless credible evidence exists that IP-inconsistent
measures are "likely to achieve more extensive human rights benefits"); Helfer, supra note 67, at 1018
(suggesting a human rights framework for IP that "first specifies the minimum outcomes-in terms of
health poverty, education, and so forth-that human rights law would require of states," and then "work
backwards to identify different mechanism available to states to achieve those outcomes," IP law being
merely one of those mechanisms).
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C. An IP Approach to Traditional Knowledge?
If a preservation approach prioritizes biodiversity preservation, and a
human rights approach prioritizes human rights concerns, then an IP approach
prioritizes the conventional purposes of intellectual property law. 94 By and
large, this approach has posed a seeming dead end to proponents of traditional
knowledge protection because of its emphasis on incentives to create, the
limited application of moral rights and labor-desert principles, and increased
concern for the public domain.
1. Incentives To Create
Intellectual property protection in the United States (and increasingly, in
much of the world) has been about generating incentives to create. Patents and
copyrights are viewed as tools to solve an economic public goods problem:
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable intellectual goods are easily copied, and in the
absence of state-created rights to exclude, creators cannot recoup their costs
and will therefore stop creating.95 The descriptive and prescriptive limitations
of this theory in capturing the actual dynamics of creation are a matter of
spirited debate among intellectual property scholars.96 But thc incentives-to-
create rationale continues to dominate the intellectual property discourse.
Not surprisingly, the assertion of new or expanded traditional knowledge
rights has fared rather poorly under this rationale. The story goes something
like this: if indigenous groups and local communities have developed healing
and agricultural practices for generations without the carrot of an intellectual
property right, then new rights are unnecessary to provide incentives to
create.97
As for future improvements to traditional knowledge, some scholars have
suggested that here too the incentives-to-create rationale fails to justify
94. See e.g., Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 56-80 (analyzing claims for TK protection
under nine major theories of property and intellectual property).
95. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 74-76 (2003) (explaining IP's optimization task); Mark Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005).
96. For example, a number of "social norms" scholars have studied the role of intellectual
property norms in various contexts, including in academia, where creators are often motivated by
nonpecuniary incentives, such as curiosity. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Property Rights Theory and the
Commons: The Case ofScientific Research, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 145 (1996); Arti K. Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77
(1999); Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer, in 16
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 97 (Gary D.
Libecap ed., 2005). Other scholars have argued for "broader" normative purposes for intellectual
property that go beyond incentives to create. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, IP', 59 STAN L. REV. 257, 331
(2007) (advocating a cultural theory of intellectual property that focuses on social relations).
97. See, e.g., Reto Hilty, Rationales for the Legal Protection of Intangible Goods and Cultural
Heritage, 40 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 883, 890 (2009) ("Nor are we confronted
with subject matter for which legal instruments would be required to provide incentives in order to
prevent market failure . . . ."); Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 73 (arguing that if the real concern
is "keep[ing] others from purloining [indigenous groups'] handiwork," then TK protection "cannot be
defended on the basis of an incentive to innovate"); Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How Property
Begets Property, 2007 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1941 ("According intellectual property protection to
tradition does not encourage new works. These works already exist.").
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alteration of the existing intellectual property regime because "standard IP rules
will suffice."98 This latter argument, however, glosses over the real challenges
associated with protecting and encouraging small "grain-sized" innovation-
for example, innovation that, in patent law terms, does not rise to the requisite
level of novelty and nonobviousness. 99 More significantly, to the extent that
scholars assess traditional knowledge through the lens of economic incentives,
their focus often centers on incentives to create. As I discuss in Part V, other
incentives rationales-in particular, incentives to disclose-may support more
robust forms of traditional knowledge protection.
2. Non-Economic Rationales: Moral Rights and Labor-Desert
Non-economic rationales for intellectual property rights, such as moral
rights and labor-desert principles, offer some (underexplored) support for
traditional knowledge rights.
Moral rights derive from the recognition that each individual possesses a
distinct personality deserving of protection-a "right of personality" that
extends to an individual's intellectual creations and persists even after copies of
the work enter the marketplace. 00 In many European countries, authors have
"moral rights" in the works they create that are distinct from the purely
economic rights that copyright law grants to authors.' 0 Commonly recognized
moral rights include the right of attribution (i.e., the right to be identified as the
author of the work) and integrity (i.e., the right to protect the work from
alterations harmful to the author's reputation).' 02
98. Stephen Munzer and Kal Raustiala, for example, point to the
important tension . .. between innovation and the focus on tradition and long-standing
practice. The more a group innovates now with regard to shared knowledge or folklore,
the less traditional it is and the more it seems like contemporary knowledge or innovation
of the sort protected, or not protected, by standard IP rights. If one thinks of TK as a
living tradition, and if that tradition has had a recent burst of innovation, then IP rights
may be justified because of that innovation, but the traditional aspect of the TK plays a
comparatively small role in the justification. The force of a claim for a new IP right . . . is
weaker the more the focus of the right rests of innovation by living persons. By the same
token, if incentives to innovate in the future are the issue, then the standard IP rules will
suffice ....
Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 73-74.
99. See e.g., Jerome Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1746-47.
100. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)
(justifying property protection based on a concept of "personhood").
101. The term "moral right" roughly translates the French term "droit moral." Pursuant to the
Berne Convention, there are many countries that protect the moral rights of authors (the United States
being a notable exception). The two most commonly discussed moral rights countries are France and
Germany.
102. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, supra note 29, provides for the protection of
attribution and integrity rights. Some jurisdictions, notably France and Germany, also recognize authors'
moral rights of divulgation or disclosure (i.e., the right to decide when and under what circumstances to
divulge the work) and withdrawal (i.e., the right to withdraw all published copies of the work if the work
no longer represents the author's views or otherwise would be detrimental to the author's reputation).
See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement ofAuthor Autonomy in United States
and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 24-34 (1994). By contrast, the
United States provides very limited moral rights protection-and only for visual artists. See Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
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But since moral rights are understood primarily as rights rooted in the
personality of the individual, and not group-based knowledge, 0 3 they offer
limited support for traditional knowledge rights.' 04 Also, given the close link
between moral rights and authorship (in fact, they are often referred to as
"author's rights"), this theoretical justification may not extend beyond
traditional cultural expressions. 05
Lockean or labor-desert theories, on the other hand, are linked to merit.
That is, a person who labors upon resources that are un-owned or "held in
common" has a natural property right to the fruits of his or her efforts, and the
state has a duty to enforce or protect that natural right.106 While labor-desert
theories are often discussed in the context of the individual, they need not be.'0 7
The more contentious issue is whether a labor-desert principle should extend to
inheritors of traditional knowledge. Munzer and Raustiala argue, for example,
that the justificatory force of labor-desert is "distinctly limited" unless it
pertains to the "originators" of traditional knowledge: "It is hard to see why
their remote descendants should deserve an IP right in TK that they did not
originate." But others disagree. Robert Merges, for example, suggests that
descendants of originators may serve as a "good enough" kind of
-109representative.
103. See, e.g., Hilty, supra note 97, at 890 (suggesting the limitations of a moral rights rationale
for traditional knowledge protection because "[w]e are neither in a position to identify an individual
right holder who could be deemed to have created or invented the subject matter in question"); see also
Safrin, supra note 97, at 1941 (arguing that "[m]oral rights justifications also have little explanatory
purchase because the people who created the traditional works are long gone").
104. Some scholars, however, have suggested "transmuting" the idea of a moral right of the
individual into a "community right." Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 68-69.
105. See, e.g, Netanel, supra note 102, at 2 (explaining that moral rights idea is based on the
notion of "literary and artistic works as inalienable extensions of the author's personality"); see also
Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1150 (noting the limitations of extending the moral rights concept as a
theoretical justification for rights in personal data because of the "special status of authorship").
106. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 170 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). As Locke wrote in his
Second Treatise of Government, "Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that Nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixes his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his Property." JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). For discussions of the Lockean justification for IP, see
generally Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); and Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law ofIntellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
107. Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 59. See generally Robert Merges, Locke for the
Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179 (2008).
108. Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 59. In a somewhat different vein, Paul Heald
suggests that even if Lockean labor theory entitles traditional knowledge holders to enjoy the fruit of
their labor-i.e., no one can stop them from using their TK-it "does little to justify a broader right to
exclude others from their own gathering activities, especially when that gathering does no apparent harm
to the commons. . . . As long as bio-prospectors do not deprive [TK-holders] of information and
resources, it is difficult to find a sanction for their behavior in Locke." Heald, supra note 1, at 527-28.
109. Merges, supra note 107, at 1190 (likening the failure of IP to adequately recognize
dispersed creativity in the modem age-e.g., open source software-to its failure to recognize
traditional knowledge). Merges argues:
A vexing problem in IP law has been efforts to figure out how to protect and
reward useful knowledge of various kinds that is developed and maintained by traditional
communities .... In these cases, the current inhabitants of traditional leadership roles are
assumed to adequately represent the generations past and future who have an interest in
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3. Traditional Knowledge and the Public Domain
More broadly, the issue of traditional knowledge protection occupies an
awkward normative place within the intellectual property discipline. Some
context is useful here. Over the past few decades, intellectual property has been
engaged in a tug of war. On the one hand, exclusive rights in information have
broadened at home and abroad, to the great benefit of corporate owners of
intellectual property. Public choice and political capture theories aside,
commentators have attributed this expansion to various conceptual factors-for
example, the trope of the "romantic author,"" 0 or the infusion of real property
rhetoric with its strong language of exclusion and condemnation of "free-
riding.""'1 Intellectual property expansionists have relied on the argument that
"[i]f some intellectual property is desirable because it encourages innovation
... more is better."" 2 On the other hand, a number of intellectual property
scholars have excoriated this "second enclosure movement."" These scholars
highlight the importance of a vibrant and accessible public domain for the
efficient production of intellectual goods.' 14
Proponents of traditional knowledge protection fit in neither camp. They
do not fit in the standard protectionist camp because the unique aspects of
traditional knowledge creation clash with the "romantic author" trope and the
prevailing incentives-to-create story. Nor do they fit in the public domain
camp, with its emphasis on open access. For many indigenous groups,
unrestricted access is "the problem, not the solution."" 5 Proponents of
traditional knowledge protection thus find themselves at odds with other groups
within the broader IP and development movement.
For example, in the context of a campaign to convince WIPO to adopt a
protecting and profiting from the traditional knowledge. There is no pretense that this is
perfect or even procedurally fair representation. But it is assumed to be the best we can
do....
What is needed in cases of dispersed creativity is to identify similar representative
people or entities. They may not speak perfectly for all contributors, but they can be
assumed to be good enough.
Id.
110. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, at x-xi (1996) (concluding that "we are driven to confer
property rights in information on those who come closest to the image of the romantic author, those
whose contributions to information production are most easily seen as original and transformative,"
which "leads us to have too many intellectual property rights"); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and
Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1335-38
(1996); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the
Emergence of the Author, 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 425, 426 (1984) (arguing that the romantic
author is a social construction). But see Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of
Property, 75 TEx. L. REV. 873, 886 (1997) (arguing that the romantic authorship trope has limited
explanatory force with respect to the development of intellectual property).
111. See Lemley, supra note 95, at 1031-32.
112. Id. at 1031 ("The thinking is that creators will not have sufficient incentive to invent unless
they are legally entitled to capture the full social value of their inventions.").
113. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Contraction of the Public Domain,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37-40 (2003).
114. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 378-86 (1999); Boyle, supra note 110.
115. BROWN, supra note 20, at 237; Rose, supra note 22, at 996.
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"development agenda," a broad coalition of advocacy groups drafted an Access
to Knowledge (A2K) Treaty.116 The treaty's central aim is to sustain open
models of innovation and to establish users' rights in information at the
international level." 7 Amy Kapczynski describes the A2K mobilization's
embrace of public domain concepts as a tool to "unify groups working in
different areas of IP and as anchors for arguments about the damage that strong
IP does to public welfare."" 8
While A2K advocates' emphasis on the public domain has proven
effective in securing important gains, particularly in the area of access to
medicines, it "creates tension" with traditional knowledge advocates.119 Instead
of "rejecting IP outright or rejecting the economic framing of the field," A2K
advocates have been able to make their claims "sound in languages not of
fundamental human rights or distributive justice, but of information economics,
innovation systems, and the need for well-functioning markets."l20 By contrast,
proponents of traditional knowledge protection have been largely unable-or
unwilling-to make arguments that sound in a language familiar to IP, to
invoke existing justifications for IP law, or effectively to link their claims to the
broader IP framework.
To be sure, commodification concerns may have stronger resonance in
the traditional knowledge context than in other IP contexts.121 But while
engaging the conventional IP approach may be controversial as a normative
matter in the traditional knowledge context, it is undoubtedly important as a
pragmatic matter. As Munzer and Raustiala rightly observe, "[B]ecause
proponents of TK generally seek protection in the form of IP rights under
international law, . . . [they] need to show how the arguments and rules which
they favor lend themselves to and fit within the existing framework [and
justifications] of international IP law." 22
In Parts IV and V, I describe how a richer understanding of trade secret
law in the traditional knowledge context can help narrow the perceived
doctrinal and normative divide between traditional knowledge protection and
intellectual property law.
116. Kapczynski, supra note 40, at 806; see Treaty on Access to Knowledge (May 9, 2005)
(draft), http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k treatymay9.pdf.
117. Kapczynski, supra note 40, at 806.
118. Id at 858-59.
119. Id
120. Id. at 867-68.
121. Sunder, supra note 96, at 275 (noting the concerns of commodification theorists about the
"propertization" of identity and cultural ossification); Taubman, supra note 23, at 558 (noting that "[tihe
very conception of TK as a form of IP" suggests to some "a form of alienation, reduction, or
commodification of an holistic cultural and spiritual heritage, a trivialization of cultural identity that is
viewed with skepticism"); see also Mezey, supra note 71, at 2005 (arguing that ideas of cultural
property are ill equipped to resolve cultural disputes, because property is fixed and controlled by its
owner, while culture is dynamic, messy and unstable, and maintaining that cultural property claims
problematically tend to "fix" and "sanitize" culture in order to make sense of it as a form of property).
122. Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 57-58.
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IV. TRADE SECRET LAW: A PRACTICAL PATH FORWARD FOR THE
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE DEBATE
Trade secret law has important implications for the traditional knowledge
debate. Trade secret law offers a practical path forward in the current
international impasse; it can protect a subset of traditional knowledge that is
relatively secret-i.e., not publicly available. In this Part, I explain the
requirements of trade secret law and its relevance and limitations for traditional
knowledge holders. And I suggest it is a narrower and more workable
alternative to the broader misappropriation approach under discussion at the
WIPO IGC, which may penalize the use of even publicly available traditional
knowledge.
A. The Basics of Trade Secret Law
While its precise origins are disputed,123 the modern form of trade secret
law is a nineteenth-century creation of Anglo-American courts. Given trade
secret law's relatively recent vintage and common law origins, it is not firmly
entrenched outside of common law countries. 124 This is beginning to change,
however, as TRIPS and other bilateral and regional agreements require
countries to protect trade secrets.125 Since trade secret law is well developed in
the United States, I begin there.
Typically, trade secret law imposes three basic requirements: (1) a broad
subject matter requirement of information that derives actual or potential
economic value because it is not generally known; (2) the trade secret holder
took reasonable precautions under the circumstances to keep the information
secret; and (3) the defendant obtained the secret by violating an express (e.g.,
contractual) or implied duty, or though other "improper means."l 26
Significantly, trade secret law encompasses far broader subject matter
than patent law. While patents cover inventions that are useful, novel, and
nonobvious in light of the existing knowledge, "[v]irtually any useful
123. At least one scholar traces trade secret-like protection to the Roman Empire. See A. Arthur
Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 837, 837-38
(1930). As early as the Renaissance, most European nation-states protected the secret processes and
ideas of guild cartels and other businesses from third party usurpation. Lemley, supra note 12, at 315
n.8.
124. Lemley, supra note 12, at 315-16.
125. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 15.02[2] (2010), 2002 WL 32164610. For a brief
overview of trade secret law in various WTO jurisdictions, see id. § 15.05 (noting the similarity between
trade secret laws in Canada, Japan, and China and trade secret laws in the United States).
126. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 36-37 (5th ed. 2010). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA), enacted in some form by most states, defines trade secrets as follows:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990) [hereinafter UTSA].
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information can qualify as a trade secret."l27 The information need not be novel
or nonobvious. Even very slight improvements to known processes or
discoveries of what does not work ("negative know-how") may qualify. 12 8 The
information need not have actual economic value; potential economic value is
sufficient.129 The information need not be "technological" in nature, as the law
covers business information like customer lists, financial projections, and
marketing plans.130 And unlike patent law, neither the identification of
individual trade secret creators nor a formal application process is required for
trade secret protection.
Trade secret law is thus a useful reminder that for over a century, the
same corporate entities that contest the protection of traditional knowledge
because it is old, communally and incrementally developed, lacking in novelty,
and its precise individual creators unknown, have regularly invoked the
protections of trade secret law to protect information that is . . . old (e.g., the
century-old Coca-Cola formula), communally and incrementally developed,
lacking in novelty, and its precise individual creators unknown.
For all its breadth, however, trade secret law offers weaker exclusionary
rights than patent law. Trade secrets are not property rights against the world in
the traditional sense, because the right to exclude applies only when
information is obtained improperly.131 Where a party develops the idea
independently or reverse engineers a lawfully obtained product to learn the
secret, no liability attaches, and that entity can do what it wants with the
information. By the same token, multiple entities may simultaneously "own"
the same trade secret if they developed it independently. This is an important
difference from patent law, and one that makes trade secret law more suitable
for traditional knowledge, where multiple neighboring groups may have long
used the same knowledge.
Another important difference from patent (and copyright) law is that trade
secret protection is not limited to a specific term of years, so longstanding
traditional knowledge may still qualify. But trade secret law does, as the name
suggests, apply only to secret information. Secrecy here, however, means
relative secrecy, not absolute secrecy. In other words, confidential information
can be shared with others who are aware of its confidentiality without losing its
status as a trade secret.132 Once the information has "escaped into the
mainstream of public knowledge," however, protection ends.' 33 Generally, the
publication of the trade secret, for example, in an academic journal or in a
127. POOLEY, supra note 125, § 1.01 (emphasis added).
128. Id. § 7.02[2].
129. See UTSA, supra note 126. The commercial value requirement is discussed further in
Section IV.D. See infra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
130. POOLEY, supra note 125, § 1.01.
131. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 241, 256-57 (1998) (discussing this characteristic of trade secret law-
why it does not "recognize property rights against the world"); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade
Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (2007).
132. See infra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
133. POOLEY,supra note 125, § 4.04[2][a].
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patent, destroys it. Thus, if information qualifies for patent protection, an
inventor must elect either patent or trade secret protection.' 34 In other instances,
the decision to publicly disclose is out of the originator's hands. For example,
one who independently develops or reverse engineers the secret can do what
she wants with it, including publicly disclosing it, which defeats even the
original trade secret holder's right.
Although trade secret law overlaps to some degree with contract
principles,' 35 it departs in significant ways. Notably, liability can extend to
strangers not in privity with the plaintiff, such as improper acquirers, those who
acquire a trade secret by accident or mistake,136 and those who knowingly or
negligently obtain information from one in privity with the plaintiff.1 In
addition, trade secret law offers a stronger array of remedies than contract law,
depending on the circumstances. These include damages based on the
defendant's gain, injunctive relief prohibiting further use and disclosure of the
information, and, in some cases, criminal penalties. 38
B. Traditional Knowledge and Three Paradigmatic Trade Secret
Situations
While trade secret protection is not as "barrier"-like as patent
protection, it can protect relatively secret traditional knowledge. Not only
does trade secret law lack many of patent law's subject matter, temporal,
monetary, and other constraints;140 it may also accommodate the concerns of
those traditional knowledge holders who want to control particular uses of their
knowledge, as well as those who are interested in obtaining a share of the
profits from commercialization. 141
134. Patent publication "affects only the information expressed in the patent itself; it is common
for the [patent] applicant to maintain related but collateral information . . . as a trade secret." POOLEY,
supra note 124, § 3.01[1][b].
135. Some commentators have suggested that trade secret law is (or should be) co-extensive
with contract law. Bone, supra note 131, at 297 (proposing that "with perhaps a few limited exceptions,
trade secrets should be protected only on contract principles").
136. UTSA, supra note 126, § 1(2)(ii)(C).
137. Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B).
138. POOLEY, supra note 125, § 4.04[l]; Lemley, supra note 12, at 324. In 1996, Congress
passed the Economic Espionage Act, which for the first time imposed federal criminal penalties for
intentional and knowing theft or unlawful disclosure of trade secrets. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839
(2006).
139. The limitations on trade secret law's application have led the U.S. Supreme Court to
observe, "Where patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve." Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) (holding that patent law does not preempt trade secret
law).
140. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
141. See WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1998-1999), at 167 (2001) [hereinafter WIPO FACT-FINDING MISSIONS
REPORT], available at http://www.wipo.intlexport/sites/www/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/pdf/part2.pdf. The
WIPO conducted nine fact-finding missions in 1998 and 1999 on the intellectual property needs and
expectations of holders of traditional knowledge. Some traditional knowledge holders already make
effective use of trade secret law under national law. For example, the Unaaq Fisheries, owned by the
Inuit people of Northern Quebec and Baffin Island, regularly transfers proprietary technologies using its
own experience in the commercial fishing industry; the techniques it develops are protected as trade
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One point of clarification: as previously noted, the term traditional
knowledge has been used to refer to a vast and varied body of information.42 It
has been used, for example, to refer not only to knowledge possessed by
specific indigenous and local communities. The term has also been used to
describe knowledge that is indigenous to a particular region or country and is
generally known by many segments of society-for example, certain aspects of
Aryuvedic medicine. Trade secret law would not apply to such information.
Toward the other end of the spectrum, however, traditional knowledge may be
known within one particular indigenous or local group, or only by specific
members of a particular group (e.g., healers), or, more commonly and
complicatedly, by a discrete number of neighboring groups within a
geographical area. It is this subset of traditional knowledge for which trade
secret law has something to offer.
In the modem commercial context, trade secret rights generally arise in
three kinds of interactions: (1) where there is a contractual agreement; (2)
where, even in the absence of a contract, the parties' relationship or conduct
leads to the inference that the information was disclosed in confidence and any
use or disclosure beyond the boundaries of confidence is wrongful; and (3)
where a party uses improper means to acquire the information (sometimes
described as "competitive intelligence" cases). 14 3 Each of these situations is
potentially relevant to traditional knowledge holders.
1. The Contractual Agreement Context
In the contractual agreement context, imagine traditional knowledge
holder T has nonpublic information to which company C (or perhaps a
bioprospector or researcher acting on C's behalf) wants access. T agrees to give
C access, but only in exchange for Ts explicit agreement to respect various
restrictions on use and disclosure, as well as a royalty or percentage of future
benefits from C's use of the information. Ts sharing of the secret information
in this context-even with multiple firms-does not make the information
"public," so long as T has exercised "reasonable" precautions to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the secret.'"
In addition, trade secret law incorporates certain default rules prohibiting
C's retransfer of that information unless separate permission is negotiated.145
As Pamela Samuelson has observed in considering the application of trade
secret rules to firms' use of personal data shared over the Internet:
The general rule of trade secrecy licensing is that if the licensor has provided
secrets under Canadian law. WIPO, Survey on Existing Form of Intellectual Property Protection for
Traditional Knowledge-Preliminary Analysis and Conclusions, at 5, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKFIIC/2/9
(Dec. 3, 2001).
142. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
143. Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1152 (delineating these three categories); see also Lemley,
supra note 12, at 318-19 (describing three common circumstances in which trade secret cases arise).
144. Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1152. Discerning "reasonable" precautions under the
circumstances is a fairly fact-specific inquiry that leads courts to differing results, but absolute secrecy is
certainly not required. See infra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
145. Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1156-57.
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data to another for a particular purpose, the data cannot be used for other
purposes without obtaining permission for the new uses....
. . . The general default rule of trade secret licensing law is that license rights
are nontransferable unless the licensor grants a right to sublicense. Sublicenses,
if permitted, generally oblige the sublicensee to abide by the same terms as the
license imposes on the now sublicensor.146
Similarly, traditional knowledge holders can bind any downstream
recipients of the information to the same restrictions that the initial purchaser
agreed to as a condition of sale. But while some local and indigenous groups
have successfully negotiated contracts-often with the help of NGOs or
national governments-others "lack basic contract negotiation, drafting and
implementation skills."l 47 For this latter group, the contractual agreement
context may be less relevant than the other two contexts in which trade secret
rights arise.
2. The Relationship-Based Context
In the relationship-based context, trade secret rights arise where
traditional knowledge holder T reveals relatively secret information to company
C under circumstances in which C would have reason to understand that
disclosure was limited-even absent any express agreement. In addition, this
trade secret can be enforced against a third party that does not itself violate a
relational duty, so long as that party has obtained the protected information
from one who it knows or has reason to know obtained the information through
breach of confidence.'48
In the modem commercial context, for example, a firm may disclose
certain nonpublic information to a consultant for a limited purpose. Even if the
parties did not have an explicit agreement limiting disclosure or use, the
consultant would know she could not sell that information or disclose it to other
entities.149 Another common example of relationship-based trade secrecy
occurs where two parties engage in precontractual negotiations. In an oft-cited
U.S. case, Smith v. Dravo Corp., the plaintiff revealed secret business
information to the defendant in the course of negotiations to determine whether
defendant would buy plaintiffs company. 50 The court determined that while
146. Id. at 1155-57; see also M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 763 (10th
Cir. 2009) (holding that a licensee misappropriated trade secrets by transferring information to a
subsidiary through a merger without the licensor's consent). While some of these restrictions are
illustrative of general contract principles, they "find strong expression in the context of trade secrets."
Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1155 n.158. Moreover, the default rule of transferability in the context of
trade secret is unlike contract law more generally. Contracts that do not involve federally granted IP
rights generally are assignable under state law unless the contract relies on the honesty, reputation, skill,
character, or ability of one of the parties. 9 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 49.1 (John E.
Murray, Jr. ed., rev. ed. 2007).
147. WIPO FACT-FINDING MISSIONS REPORT, supra note 141, at 95.
148. See UTSA, supra note 126, § 1(2) (1985); POOLEY, supra note 125, § 2.03[3][a];
Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1157.
149. Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1152-53; see also Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Systems,
Inc., 887 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a verbal promise of confidentiality defeated the
defendant's motion for summary judgment).
150. 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
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"no express promise or trust was exacted from defendant," it was "implied
from the relationship of the parties."' 5 ' As a result, the defendant was enjoined
from making further use of the information. 152
Similarly, relatively secret information revealed by traditional knowledge
holders to outsiders can be protected from further use or disclosure when
implied by the parties' relationship. For example, suppose that company C (or a
government research institute) approaches representatives of T to learn of the
medicinal uses of various plants. T has historically used the nut of a local tree
for hunger-suppressing purposes; T is interested in selling this nonpublic
information to C. But C is unwilling to buy the information unless T first
reveals it, and C can run its own tests to confirm that the nut does what T says.
Where T discloses the information for this limited purpose, C would not be able
to use the information for other purposes or disclose it to others, even in the
absence of an express agreement to that effect. In such a case, trade secret law
would limit C's ability to take advantage of T because "[t]rust was reposed" in
C by T that "the information thus transmitted would be accepted subject to that
limitation," and C "knew and understood this limited purpose."
153
Relevant case law in the traditional knowledge context is undeveloped.
But at least one Australian court has enjoined an outsider's use of indigenous
knowledge based on an implied relational duty-albeit in different factual
circumstances. In Foster v Mountford, the Supreme Court of the Northern
Territory in Australia enjoined the sale (within a certain geographical area) of a
noted anthropologist's book that contained sensitive information about the
Pitjantjara people, including locations of sacred tribal sites and rituals.15 4 The
author had gained this otherwise secret information in the course of
anthropological fieldwork. A Pitjanjara tribal body brought suit against the
author and publisher of the book on behalf of the Pitjantjara community. In
concluding that the author had an implied duty of confidence not to reveal
certain information he had obtained, the court explained: "[W]hilst there is no
evidence by document or conversation or indeed by recognized legal
scholarship of the manner in which the confidence was reposed, I am satisfied
that the book reveals some secrets . . . which it was understood would not be
revealed when the trust was imposed.15 5
Finally, the most common example of a relationship-based duty in trade
secret cases is that of an employer-employee relationship. Though employment
contracts are now widespread in the modem commercial context, employees
151. Id. at 376.
152. Id. at 378.
153. Id. at 377.
154. Foster v Mountford (1976) 29 FLR 233 (Austl.). The court's analysis was not based on
trade secret law, but rather on a more general duty of good faith. Id. at 237-38.
155. Id. at 235. For an interesting discussion of this case, see BROWN, supra note 20, at 33-34.
The fact that this information was to be used for academic rather than more commercial purposes has led
to criticism of this opinion-specifically, claims about its potential stifling effects on academic inquiry.
More recently, Barton Beebe has pointed to the Foster opinion as an example of indigenous groups'
efforts to limit access to TCEs by members of their own societies "in order to facilitate, among other
things, the enforcement of social hierarchy and the production of social homeostasis." Barton Beebe,
Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REv. 809, 877 (2010).
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are held to a duty to protect their employers' interest in secret practices and
information even absent an explicit contract.156 An interesting parallel can be
made between employees' duties to protect their employers' secrets and the
duty of an indigenous group's individual members to protect the group's
secrets. In both contexts, the individual's liberty interest must be balanced
against the obligation of loyalty to the firm or group. In the traditional
knowledge context, local customary law and its restrictions on how individuals
in the group can use information or share it with outsiders may substitute for a
duty of confidence secured expressly through contract or impliedly through the
employee relationship.' 57
While this potential intersection of local customary law and trade secret is
also undeveloped in the case law, at least one prominent decision in a copyright
infringement suit (again from Australia) suggests the potential role of
customary law in delineating the individual's obligation to the indigenous
group. In Bulun Bulun v R. & T. Textiles Pty. Ltd,'58 Johnny Bulun Bulun, a
member of the Ganalpingu aboriginal community, created a painting reflecting
the religious and mythical knowledge of his clan. The creation of these
paintings was a sacred duty entrusted to him by his clan community, as Bulun
Bulun acknowledged. The defendant, a textile company, used images of Bulun
Bulun's work without his permission in ways that were deeply disturbing to the
community. Looking to the "laws and customs of the Ganalpingu people," the
court determined that Bulun Bulun had "fiduciary obligations" to the
community.' 59 Although Bulun Bulun was entitled to sell his artwork in
accordance with community principles, the court explained that he could not
"exploit the artistic work in a way that is contrary to the laws and custom of the
Ganalbingu people." 6 0 The court concluded that Bulun Bulun had a duty to
take action in the event of copyright infringement by a third party-which in
this case, he had. '6
Though indigenous group advocates may celebrate a decision like Bulun
156. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 318.
157. See Taubman & Leistner, supra note 15, at 132-33.
158. (1998) 41 IPR 513 (Austl.). The principal defendant in this copyright case was a Brisbane-
based textile company that had imported fabric imprinted with images taken from one of Bulun Bulun's
best-known paintings, Magpie Geese and Water Lilies at the Waterhole. The defendant company used
Bulun Bulun's work without his permission or paying him royalties. From the clan's perspective, the
infringement of Bulun Bulun's work also harmed the community-thus the inclusion of a second
plaintiff, a senior clan official named George Milpurruru. For extended discussions of this case, see, for
example, BROWN, supra note 20, at 43-54; Colin Golvan, Aboriginal Art and Copyright, The Case for
Johnny Bulun Bulun, II EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 346 (1989).
159. Bulun Bulun, 41 LPR at 530. In explaining its consideration of customary indigenous law,
the court explained:
[T]he law and custom of the Ganalbingu people [is] part of the factual matrix which
characterises the relationship as one of mutual trust and confidence. It is that relationship
which the Australian legal system recognises as giving rise to the fiduciary relationship,
and to the obligations which arise out of it.
Id.
160. Id. at 513.
161. Because Bulun Bulun had vigorously defended his copyright, the court determined that he
had satisfied his fiduciary obligations. The court also noted that if Bulun Bulun had not taken action to
enforce his copyright, the clan would be entitled to take remedial action to enforce it. Id.
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Bulun, it does raise troubling issues of individual autonomy vis-A-vis the group.
As some scholars have observed, the recognition of group rights may privilege
"cultural orthodoxy over progressive cultural dissent," reinforce traditional
gender and other hierarchies, and result in undue "repression of individual
autonomy within a culture."l 62 The question of an individual's obligation to the
indigenous group becomes even murkier when individuals leave, intermarry, or
otherwise mix with the larger population.163 Why should those who have
chosen to leave the community be bound by information restrictions mandated
by the group? Yet even in the ordinary commercial context, courts must
grapple with thorny issues of demarcation-for example the "very difficult"
and highly fact-specific task of delineating an employee's freely transferable
"general skill, knowledge and training" from an employer's protectable trade
secret.'" While the traditional knowledge context introduces a new level of
complexity to this calculus, suffice it to say, courts can consider local
customary law when assessing a relationship-based duty-just as they look to
industry or firm custom in the modem commercial context.' 65
3. The "Improper Means" Context
Trade secret issues also arise when an unrelated party (often, a
competitor) uses "improper means" to acquire relatively secret information.
Improper means have been found in various situations, including theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, inducement or knowing participation in a breach of
confidence, and eavesdropping or other espionage. There is, however, no
"complete catalogue" of improper means.' 66 The term is fairly broad and does
not require an act to be independently actionable; for example, courts have
deemed "dumpster diving" by competitors to be improper means in some
cases. 167 In addition, a trade secret can be enforced against a third party that
162. Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 69, 75 (2000). In the real property context, Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller
have argued that a legal regime should ideally facilitate a "liberal commons," in which "a limited group
of owners [can] capture the economic and social benefits from cooperative use" of a given resource,
"while also ensuring autonomy to individual members who retain a secure right to exit." Hanoch Dagan
& Michael Heller, Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 553 (2001).
163. See, e.g., Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 61 (noting this concern); see also BROWN,
supra note 20, at 66 (discussing similar concerns for "urban Aboriginals").
164. POOLEY, supra note 125, § 4.01[3]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995) ("The distinction between trade secrets and general skill, knowledge,
training, and experience is intended to achieve a reasonable balance between the protection of
confidential information and the mobility of employees.").
165. The extent to which customary law is recognized and enforced varies among and between
States' legal systems. See generally Paul Kuruk, The Role of Customary Law Under Sui Generis
Frameworks of Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 67 (2007). The question of how to ensure consistent recognition of local customary laws
among and between states is indeed a challenging one that is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
discussion of this issue, see Taubman, supra note 23, at 556-57.
166. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970)
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f(1939)).
167. Douglass Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help, I J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 215, 226
(2005) (describing dumpster diving as an act that is "in many jurisdictions sufficient to support an
allegation under trade secret law, but not is not typically in and of itself a tort or trespass"); see also
POOLEY, supra note 124, § 6.02[2](e) (describing cases in which dumpster diving by competitors is
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does not itself engage in improper means, so long as that party has obtained the
protected information from one whom the party knows or has reason to know
obtained the information by improper means.
The paradigmatic improper means case in the United States is E.L
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher.169 In that case, the court held that
the defendants misappropriated secrets when they engaged in the fully legal act
of taking aerial photographs of the plaintiffs engineering plant while it was
under construction. The court explained that .' improper' will always be a word
of many nuances, determined by time, place, and circumstances."1 70
For traditional knowledge holders, a trade secret claim based on improper
means may arise, for example, where C obtains relatively secret information
from a member of T through bribery or misrepresentation or providing
misleading information about the true purposes for which the information is
sought.171 The WIPO IGC has outlined a list of "acts of misappropriation,"
some of which may serve as examples of improper means in the traditional
knowledge context.172 As in the modem commercial context, "the line between
proper and improper behavior can be difficult to draw" 173 -and perhaps even
more so in the traditional knowledge context, where parties may have radically
different levels of sophistication.
C. Demonstrating Reasonable Secrecy Precautions
What constitutes reasonable secrecy precautions under the circumstances
in the traditional knowledge context? Daniel Gervais has suggested that
indigenous and local communities cannot point to contracts or other "hard"
evidence to demonstrate efforts to keep knowledge secret. 174 In the modem
commercial context, however, courts look not just to the existence of
deemed improper means).
168. See UTSA, supra note 126, § 1(2); POOLEY, supra note 125, § 2.03[3][a]; Samuelson,
supra note 73, at 1157.
169. E.I. DuPont, 431 F.2d. 1012.
170. Id at 1017.
171. Such hypotheticals are not farfetched. See, e.g., Winston S. Nagan, Misappropriation of
Shuar Traditional Knowledge (TK) and Trade Secrets: A Case Study on Biopiracy in the Amazon, 15 J.
TECH. L. & POL'Y 9, 26-27 (2010) (describing the bribing of Shuar officials with scholarships and visa
priority in return for traditional knowledge information).
172. WIPO Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional
Knowledge & Folklore, Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Overview of Policy Objectives and Core
Principles, at 5, 7th Sess., WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/5 (Aug. 20, 2004) [hereinafter WIPO,
Overview]; see also Taubman & Leistner, supra note 15, at 156-67 (discussing this list). The WIPO
IGC's list is, however, quite broad, including not only direct acts of deliberate misappropriation (e.g.,
theft, coercion, fraud, the provision of misleading information when trying to obtain prior informed
consent), but also misappropriation in the form of unjust enrichment, deriving commercial benefit
without compensating TK holders when compensation "would be consistent with fairness and equity in
relation to the holders of the knowledge in view of the circumstances in which the user acquired the
knowledge." WIPO, Overview, supra at 21.
173. POOLEY, supra note 125, § 6.02.
174. Gervais, supra note 10, at 968 (noting that instead "secrecy usually follows from the fact
that only few people have access to the information based on customary laws and practices"); see also
Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 61 (suggesting that while the "concept of trade secrecy can apply
to indigenous peoples more easily," on the other hand, "contractual control over disclosure in
commercial settings has no clear analog in tribal contexts").
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nondisclosure agreements (though such agreements are commonplace). Courts
view the reasonable secrecy requirement as a flexible one that is dependent on
factual circumstances. Consequently, courts have looked to a variety of
evidence, including a firm's customs with respect to secrecy, its use of
password protections or confidential databases, and the extent to which it
otherwise provides employees with notice that certain information should not
be shared with those outside the company.
Similarly, in the traditional knowledge context, courts can look to a
group's local customary law as evidence of efforts to constrain the diffusion of
traditional knowledge with respect to outsiders.' 76 But as previously noted, case
law in this area is still undeveloped.177 Moreover, the number of people within
the indigenous group who know the secret would not necessarily have to be
small to satisfy the reasonable secrecy requirement.178 Within the modem firm,
for example, customer lists, marketing data, and similar information may be
known or available to many employees without destroying its status as a trade
secret. 179
A bigger impediment to maintaining secrecy arises when multiple groups
hold the same traditional knowledge. One of the virtues of trade secret law for
traditional knowledge holders (at least conceptually) is that multiple groups can
"own" the same secret if they developed it independently. But this makes the
containment project trickier. A group might be able to restrict its own members
from sharing-indeed, a court might even defer to that group's custom-but it
cannot do anything about another group's decision to share that same
information. Thus, the more widely the same knowledge is distributed among
different indigenous and local communities, the less likely that trade secret law
will prove an effective vehicle for protection.'80 The usefulness of trade secret
law in such circumstances may depend on the ability of groups to create
"'limited commons' resources that are shared within a group but that are off-
175. POOLEY, supra note 125, § 4.04[2][b] ("[F]or example, a small, family-owned company
with no history of information loss will be held to a relatively lesser standard."); id. (listing cases in
which owners' secrecy efforts are deemed sufficient, even in the absence of nondisclosure agreements).
Courts often focus on whether employees knew or had notice of the confidential nature of the
information. Id.
176. Taubman & Leistner, supra note 15, at 132.
177. See supra notes 154-159 (discussing Foster and Bulun Bulun and courts' use of customary
law).
178. See Dutfield, supra note 10, at 259. On this point, a 1993 report of the Congressional
Research Service states, "[I]f a shaman or other individual has exclusive access to information because
of his status in the group, that individual or the indigenous group together probably has a trade secret."
Id. (quoting JOSEPHINE R. AXT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93-478 A, BIOTECHNOLOGY,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 63 (1993)).
179. See, e.g., POOLEY, supra note 125, § 4.04[3]. In the traditional knowledge context, there
may be an added reason not to apply the reasonable secrecy requirement in a way that encourages
hoarding of knowledge by only a few members of the group. Namely, "When esoteric knowledge is held
by only a handful of anointed experts, entire bodies of tradition may be lost through a few unexpected
deaths." BROWN, supra note 20, at 31.
180. See, e.g., Heald, supra note 1, at 522 n. 12 (suggesting that the distribution of knowledge
between different groups makes using trade secret impracticable). Of course, the same is true for firms.
See Milgrim, TRADE SECRETS § 1.07[2] ("[A]s a plurality of independent use begins . . . the secret
erodes.").
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limits to free exploitation to outsiders."' 88
An experimental project by twelve Dhekuana Indian tribes (with help
from the NGO Otro Futuro in Venezuela) is an example of just such an effort.
These tribes are developing a closed access database of traditional information,
including ethnobotanical knowledge. Part of the experiment involves
establishing a community foundation-in effect, a board of directors for the
tribes-in which rights could be vested. The community foundation intends to
treat the ethnobotanical knowledge as trade secrets, not to be disclosed to
outsiders unless they agree to pay royalties to the foundation.182 Though
outsiders may attempt to gain the information through other channels-for
example, from a disgruntled or opportunistic group member-the group's act
of maintaining a closed access database should be evidence of reasonable
secrecy efforts, as it is in the modem commercial context, particularly if group
members had notice of it.' 83
Similarly, in Ecuador, various indigenous and local groups have
participated in an experimental project to treat traditional knowledge as trade
secret, in conjunction with the NGO Ecociencia.184 Ecociencia catalogues and
registers botanical knowledge from various groups interested in participating in
closed-access databases. Each community or group has its own file. Ecociencia
does separate checks to verify whether different groups or communities have
the same knowledge, and if there is overlap, future benefits are shared among
the relevant groups. Ecociencia also compares the registered knowledge with
Napralert, a comprehensive database relating to plants and ethnobotanical
knowledge, to assess if the traditional knowledge is already publicly available.
If it is not there, Ecociencia treats the community or communities with the
knowledge as having a trade secret and discloses it to companies under terms of
confidentiality and benefit sharing guaranteed by contract. Thus far, the
database contains approximately eight thousand entries, forty percent of which
had already been published in Napralert. The remaining sixty percent are
181. Keith Aoki, "Free Seeds, Not Free Beer": Participatory Plant Breeding, Open Source
Seeds, and Acknowledging User Innovation in Agriculture, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2275, 2275-76 (2009)
(discussing the ways in which the International Treaty of Plant Genetic Resources creates a type of
"limited commons" for certain crops). For analyses of limited commons and common pool
arrangements, see, for example, Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities:
Information as a Common Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Ill (2003) (discussing how
certain types of information may be optimally managed as "common pool resources" rather than as
private property); and Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 144, 160-61 (1998) (describing limited
commons as private "property on the outside, commons on the inside" and the application of this
concept to traditional creations). More recently, Michael Madison, Brett Frischmann, and Katherine
Strandburg have analyzed commons and pooling arrangements in the knowledge environment (e.g.,
patent pools, open source software, and research universities), building on Ostrom's work examining the
natural environment. Michael Madison, Brett Frischmann & Katherine Strandburg, Constructing
Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 657 (2010).
182. Frank J. Penna & Coenraad J. Visser, Cultural Industries and Intellectual Property Rights,
in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 390, 397 (Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo &
Philip English eds., 2002).
183. Cf POOLEY, supra note 125, § 4.04[2][b] (noting the role of employer's notice to
employees about the confidential nature of information in gauging reasonable secrecy efforts).
184. DUTFIELD, supra note 16, at 106.
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treated as trade secrets. At least three companies interested in accessing the
database have approached Ecociencia.185
Increasingly, a number of traditional knowledge holders have turned to
strategies involving self-documentation and maintenance of information in
closed-access databases. The Cree community in Canada, for example, is
documenting its own traditional ecological knowledge; some knowledge will
be shared with people beyond the community, and some will not.186 Another
group of North American indigenous communities, the Tulalip tribes, have
developed Storybase, a digital collection of their traditional knowledge. While
community leaders permit some of the traditional knowledge to be disclosed
outside the community, they identify other information for use solely within the
Tulalip community; they make these determinations according to local
customary law.' 87
Interestingly, that trade secret law imposes a separate requirement of
reasonable secrecy precautions is itself the subject of debate among intellectual
property scholars.'8 8 Such self-help measures are a somewhat unusual condition
for obtaining a legal remedy; as Douglass Lichtman observes, "[p]roperty
owners are not required to erect a fence in order to later sue an unwelcome
visitor for trespass."189 Some courts and scholars justify the requirement of
reasonable secrecy efforts as evidence of the information's economic value
(i.e., groups would not bother guarding worthless information). Others regard it
as evidence of the defendant's wrongful acquisition (i.e., it probably took some
kind of funny business to get around the fences set up by the trade secret
holder).190 And still others point to the practical aspects of the rule: reasonable
secrecy efforts "usually work," and "[t]o the extent that they do, there is no loss
and no lawsuit."l91
D. The Uncertain Effect of TRIPS's "Commercial Use" Language
Titled "Protection of Undisclosed Information," Article 39 of TRIPS
185. Id.; see also KARIN TIMMERMANS, TRIPS, CBD AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINES:
CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONs § 8.2 (2001), available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocsles/d/Jh2996el
12.2.html (noting, however, that one potential concern with this experimental project is that the parties
to the contract are the interested company and the government of Ecuador).
186. WIPO FACT-FINDING MISSIONS REPORT, supra note 141, at 120. In turning to self-
documentation, the Cree "were univocal that the decision making-process about TK documentation
would have to follow traditional structures of governance and authority: 'The elders have to decide what
needs to be protected and documented. For instance on our traditional medicine, our Elders have said
that they don't want to have it published."' Id. (quoting Statement of Cree Representatives at the
Roundtable on IP and TK at the Grand Council of the Crees, Montreal (Nov. 30, 1998)).
187. WIPO, supra note 45, at 20.
188. Mark Lemley, for example, suggests that reasonable secrecy measures should not be an
independent element of a trade secret claim. Lemley, supra note 12, at 349-50.
189. Lichtman, supra note 167, at 226.
190. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 126, at 56-57; Lichtman, supra note 167, at 229-30.
191. POOLEY, supra note 125, § 4.04[l]. Douglass Lichtman suggests, however, that this point
might lead to the opposite conclusion: if reasonable secrecy measures usually work, then firms would do
it anyway and the law need not encourage it with a separate requirement. Lichtman, supra note 167, at
228-29.
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describes member countries' obligation to protect trade secrets.' 92 It recognizes
the same basic elements of a trade secrecy claim as the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (UTSA)193 : information of value that is not generally known, reasonable
secrecy efforts, and inappropriate acquisition. But the wording of Article 39
does differ from the UTSA in one significant way. Article 39 covers
undisclosed information that "has commercial value" without the UTSA's
qualifying terms of "actual or potential" economic value.194 Consequently, the
application of Article 39 to as yet un-commercialized traditional knowledge is
uncertain.195  A trade secret approach to traditional knowledge at the
international level would require clarifying-and broadening-Article 39's
commercial value requirement.
Even such a broader interpretation of the commercial use requirement
could pose certain evidentiary challenges for traditional knowledge holders,
particularly those who are opposed to commercializing their knowledge or are
unwilling to describe their knowledge in terms of economic value. Under any
version of the commercial use requirement, claimants would need to show that
the information has more than just spiritual or other non-economic value-if
not to themselves, then to the parties that misappropriated it. Nonprofit
religious organizations making trade secret claims in the United States have
faced similar obstacles with respect to the commercial use requirement-and
have had varying degrees of success.' 96
192. TRIPS, supra note 8, pt. 2, § 7 tit. Article 39 requires countries to protect information
within the control of "natural and legal persons" from being "disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices," so long as such information
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and
assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; (b) has
commercial value because it is secret; and (c) has been subject to reasonable steps under
the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 39(2). A footnote to the text explains that "a manner contrary to honest
commercial practices" shall mean "at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence
and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who
knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition."
Id. art. 39(2) n.10.
193. UTSA, supra note 126.
194. POOLEY, supra note 125, § 15.02[3][a].
195. Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 42, at 61.
196. In decisions involving use of scriptural material allegedly stolen from the Church of
Scientology, the Ninth Circuit has held that religious information alleged to have only spiritual value
cannot be a trade secret, but may qualify if it has economic value. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 869
F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1989) ("This time, the Church argued that the scriptures qualified as trade
secrets because they had economic value."); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1090
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987) ("To be protictable [sic] as a trade secret ... the
confidential material must convey an actual or potential commercial advantage, presumably measurable
in dollar terms. We do not accept that a trade secret can be based on the spiritual advantage the Church
believes it adherents acquire over non-adherents by using the materials in the prescribed manner."); see
also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1252 (N.D. Cal.
1995) ("[T]here is no authority for excluding religious materials from trade secret protection because of
their nature. Indeed, there is no authority for excluding any type of information because of its nature.");
Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 633-34 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that the religious
materials had economic value to the defendant).
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E. Independent Development, Reverse Engineering, Public
Availability, and Enforcement Challenges
From the perspective of traditional knowledge holders, trade secret law is
limited in that it does not protect against an outsider's use of independently
developed, reverse engineered, or publicly available information. As previously
noted, trade secret law sweeps more broadly than patent law, but it offers more
fragile protection.' 97 For example, if company C lawfully obtains a plant and
discovers its beneficial uses (e.g., for suppressing hunger or inducing sleep)
through its own research, or reverse engineers an existing product that
incorporates traditional knowledge to discover this information, then it is fair
game. Even if an indigenous community objects to this use because the same
plant has been used from time immemorial for sacred purposes, the community
has no trade secret claim.
These limitations will no doubt trouble a number of traditional knowledge
holders, particularly because some traditional knowledge is already public-
described in academic publications, on the labels of commercially marketed
products, or in publicly available traditional knowledge databases. 198 Some
indigenous and local communities have, in fact, expressed opposition to any
documentation efforts "until appropriate protective measures are in place,"
fearing that they will "merely facilitate the unauthorized exploitation of TK."' 9 9
But self-documentation strategies or participation in closely held databases are
compatible with trade secret law. And as described above, a number of
traditional knowledge holders have turned to such strategies. For other groups,
NGOs like Otro Futuro and Ecociencia can act as "infomediary" entities, 200
helping them to develop closed-access archives and facilitating disclosure and
negotiation with "outsiders."201
Other difficulties from the perspective of traditional knowledge holders
include monitoring and enforcement-for example, learning that violations
have taken place, litigating those violations, and obtaining timely remedies.
NGOs and government agencies can help (and in some cases have helped) ease
some of these challenges for traditional knowledge holders. To this end,
national and international bodies should continue to promote educational and
197. See supra Section IV.A.
198. See supra Subsection II.C.2. Nonetheless, the issue of when publication destroys trade
secrecy is itself complicated. Information that is publicly available but obscure might still be a secret,
"such as posting on a single server on the internet where no index points to the information." Michael
Risch, Trade Secret Law and Information Development Incentives, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE
SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., forthcoming 2011); see also NEV. REv. STAT. § 600A.055 (2001) (preserving an illicit
posting's secrecy if trade secret owner acts quickly to enjoin the publication); DVD Copy Control Ass'n
v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("Publication on the Internet does not
necessarily destroy the secret if the publication is sufficiently obscure or transient or otherwise limited
so that it does not become generally known to the relevant people, i.e., potential competitors or other
persons to whom the information would have some economic value.").
199. WIPO FACT-FINDING MISSIONS REPORT, supra note 141, at 90.
200. Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1158.
201. Penna & Visser, supra note 182, at 397.
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capacity building efforts within these communities.202 Some commentators
have proposed the use of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, such as
mediation and arbitration, in resolving traditional knowledge disputes.203
The issue of enforcement is, of course, complicated by the fact that
national laws-rather than any uniform international law-determine the
specific nature and application of enforcement measures. While TRIPS does
require member countries to make available fair, equitable, timely, and
effective procedures for the enforcement of intellectual property rights
(including trade secrets),204 in practice, this is not always the case. Even for
modern firms, the overburdened and inefficient court systems of developing
countries pose significant challenges for obtaining timely and effective legal
remedies. Thus, enforcement remains an ongoing challenge for any traditional
knowledge policy.
F. Comparing a Trade Secret Approach with a Broader
Misappropriation Regime
The WIPO IGC's draft "Objectives and Principles"-which will form the
basis of an upcoming international instrument to protect traditional
knowledge-revolve around a general norm against misappropriation.205 These
draft provisions will be subject to ongoing revision and debate as the WIPO
IGC engages in text-based negotiations over the next several months.206 The
draft provisions attempt to synthesize and distill approaches to TK protection
that are reflected in a variety of national, regional, and international legal
instruments (including those described in Part III).207 At the same time, the
draft provisions are concerned with maintaining maximum flexibility "to
national and regional authorities over the choice of precise policy options and
legal mechanisms may be selected at the national or regional levels to achieve
or implement them." 208 In attempting to reconcile a number of disparate
national and regional approaches to traditional knowledge, the WIPO IGC
focuses on a broad misappropriation norm as the glue that more or less holds
them together.209
202. See, e.g., WIPO, supra note 45, at 5, 14-15 (discussing steps taken by WIPO to build
capacity and "addressing both policy and practical linkages between the IP system and the concerns of
practitioners and custodians of traditional knowledge").
203. See, e.g., J. Janewa OseiTutu, A Sui Generis Regime for Traditional Knowledge: The
Cultural Divide in Intellectual Property Law, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 147, 211 (2011); Jacques
de Werra, Fighting Against Biopiracy: Does the Obligation To Disclose in Patent Applications Truly
Help?, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143, 175-77 (2009).
204. TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 41-61. Article 41, for example, provides that "[p]rocedures
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable" and "[t]hey shall
not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays."
Id art. 41(2). See supra note 39 and accompanying text for a discussion of WTO dispute settlement
procedures that may be initiated by member governments for noncompliance with TRIPS requirements.
205. WIPO, Traditional Knowledge Objectives, supra note 3, Annex at 3-4.
206. See supra note 72.
207. Taubman & Leistner, supra note 15, at 156-57.
208. WIPO, Overview, supra note 172, at 4-5.
209. Id. at 6.
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While the concept of misappropriation is certainly linked to trade
secrecy,210 it is worth considering how an international regime for traditional
knowledge protection based on trade secret law may differ from, and ultimately
be preferable to, the broader misappropriation regime outlined in the WIPO
IGC draft provisions.211 The difference is not so much that the draft provisions
define "acts of misappropriation" expansively (as even within trade secret law
the concept of misappropriation or "improper means" is often ill defined).212
Instead, the key difference is that under the WIPO IGC's broad
misappropriation norm, there is no requirement that the information be
relatively secret to warrant protection.
While the term of protection in both a trade secret and misappropriation
regime is indefinite, under the former, the public availability of information
ends the term of protection. But under the proposed misappropriation
provisions, protection exists so long as the traditional knowledge "is
maintained by traditional holders, remains distinctively associated with them,
and remains integral to their collective identity," without an assessment of
213whether the information is, in fact, publicly available. Indeed, the potential
expansiveness of this approach, and its potential inclusion of publicly available
information, is a subject of ongoing debate in the current text-based
214
negotiations.
A broad misappropriation norm might, as the WIPO IGC suggests,
accommodate maximum national flexibility in tinkering with traditional
knowledge protection. But its expansive nature might also render it
unworkable. As Antony Taubman observes, "It may be difficult retrospectively
to translate a culturally rooted sense of misappropriation into a firm legal rule
against misuse that one can sustain in foreign jurisdictions." 215 By contrast, the
requirement of relative secrecy (i.e., that the information was not readily
accessible to the public) in trade secret law offers a starting point and limiting
principle to what is otherwise a virtually unbounded cause of action for any
behavior by outsiders that traditional knowledge holders deem objectionable. 216
210. See supra notes 166-170 and accompanying text (explaining that a claim for trade secret
violation requires the defendant to misappropriate the secret, by violating a relational duty or "improper
means").
211. In the states that have adopted the UTSA, a misappropriation claim based on the same set
of facts as a trade secret claim is considered "displaced" by the statute. The misappropriation doctrine
"may ultimately survive only as a special remedy for a special situation: the protection of extremely
time-sensitive information," or "hot news," of the sort at issue in International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). POOLEY, supra note 125, § 3.04.
212. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
213. WIPO, Traditional Knowledge Objectives, supra note 3, at 47. While the draft provisions
state that national authorities "may exclude from the principle of prior informed consent the fair use of
traditional knowledge which is already available to the general public," users of that traditional
knowledge must nonetheless "provide equitable compensation for industrial and commercial uses of that
traditional knowledge." Id. at 44.
214. See WIPO Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional
Knowledge & Folklore, Revised Provisions for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Policy
Objectives and Core Principles, at 20, Annex to The Protection of Traditional Knowledge & Folklore,
18th Sess., WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/18/5 (Jan. 10, 2011).
215. Taubman, supra note 15, at 528.
216. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 314.
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The secrecy limitation exists in trade secret law to achieve a balance
between providing legal rights over information and access to that
information-i.e., it provides some basis for defining the legal right lest it
"sweep too broadly."217 As Lemley describes:
If I can get ownership rights in any information, no matter how public, the
result will be to deter, not promote, the dissemination of that information. . .. If
any idea, no matter how public, is subject to a claim of legal rights, individuals
and companies will reasonably worry about using any information they do not
themselves develop.28
Requiring the existence of relative secrecy prevents trade secret law from
turning into a "standardless, free-roaming right to sue competitors for business
conduct that courts or juries might be persuaded to deem objectionable." 219
Indeed, this is a broader criticism of unfair competition or unjust enrichment
claims. Resolution of such claims "still requires some external source to
determine what behavior is and is not moral."220 By treating as the starting
point for such cases the existence of a trade secret, as opposed to what
plaintiffs perceive as improper use of their information, the law "may help
ensure that the plaintiff clearly defines what it claims to own, rather than . . .
falling back on vague hand waving." 22 1
In the long run, a broad misappropriation tort may create the kind of
unpredictability and inconsistency that prevents firms from collaborating with
traditional knowledge holders-and ultimately impedes innovation and the
dissemination of new ideas. Trade secret law is thus a narrower-and likely
more workable-alternative to a pure misappropriation approach.
Moreover, many traditional knowledge communities already rely on
secrecy to protect and manage traditional knowledge. Thus, to some extent, a
trade secret approach to traditional knowledge represents a convergence of
customary knowledge management systems and formal law. In that sense, it
moves one step closer to resolving the vexing "paradox" of traditional
knowledge protection at the international level: to "find common standards for
giving global recognition to the irreducibly diverse and local."222
217. Id. at 338.
218. Id
219. Id. at 343.
220. Id at 327. Jerome Reichman offers a slightly different criticism of broad unfair
competition laws in the IP context:
Empirically, unfair competition norms enable courts to adopt temporary measures to
alleviate the tensions that arise from gaps in the domestic systems of innovation. Over
time, however, when legislatures fail to intervene (or when they choose to intervene
inopportunely), courts applying these amorphous principles of unfair competition law to
deep-rooted problems of small-scale innovation tend to become part of the problem rather
than agents of any real solution.
Reichman, supra note 99, at 1788.
221. Lemley, supra note 12, at 344.
222. Taubman, supra note 23, at 555.
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V. TRADE SECRET LAW: A NORMATIVE GUIDE FOR TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION
In this Part, I move beyond the practical possibilities of trade secret law
for traditional knowledge holders and suggest its theoretical possibilities. As
previously discussed, the rationales for protecting traditional knowledge may
be diverse, encompassing concerns of human and indigenous rights, cultural
diversity, and biodiversity conservation. And yet, despite these myriad
rationales, can traditional knowledge protection nonetheless further the
purposes of IP law?
In this Part, I explain how trade secret law can serve as a normative guide
for theorizing traditional knowledge protection. Trade secret law itself emerged
from a complicated stew of rationales-from "commercial morality" concerns
to absolutist conceptions of property.223 But despite these complex origins,
modem trade secret law may actually serve the broader "disclosure" purposes
of intellectual property law by reducing holders' overinvestment in secrecy,
fostering trust, and encouraging disclosure of secret information to parties who
can improve or make more productive use of it. Building on this "disclosure"
justification for trade secret law, I argue that traditional knowledge protection
may similarly lessen the distrust of local and indigenous communities toward
outsiders and encourage collaboration and disclosure of traditional knowledge
to more productive users.
A. Understanding Trade Secrets as a Form of IP
The justifications for protecting trade secrets have puzzled courts and
scholars for over a century.224 Trade secrets, though commonly labeled a form
of intellectual property-often, the most valuable form of intellectual property
owned by firms today 225 _are radically different from other types of
intellectual property. Because of trade secret law's unique characteristics-
including the requirement of relative secrecy, concern with the way a defendant
obtains the secret, and the panoply of available remedies (damages, injunctive
relief, even criminal sanctions)-it has proven difficult to elicit any scholarly
agreement on the theoretical justifications for trade secret law and its place
within existing legal doctrine.
Depending on whom you ask, you might hear that the justifications for
trade secret law are best laid at the doorstep of tort, property, contract, or even
criminal law.226 Trade secret decisions over the last century offer little in the
22
way of clarity.227 The theoretical incoherence surrounding the doctrine has led
223. See infra notes 226-230.
224. Lemley, supra note 12, at 314.
225. See Bone, supra 131, at 243. Trade secrets are particularly important to small companies
because of the large costs associated with securing patents and patent litigation.
226. Lemley, supra note 12, at 319-28.
227. Trade secret decisions over the last century rely in roughly equal measure on tort
concepts-emphasizing breach of confidence and the need to enforce to "minimum standards of
commercial morality"-and property concepts. See Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1173. These two views
are reflected in a pair of Supreme Court decisions, separated by nearly seventy years. The Supreme
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Robert Bone to conclude that "there is no such thing as a normatively
autonomous body of trade secret law," and a separate law of trade secret is,
therefore, unnecessary.228 In a recent article, Mark Lemley argues that trade
secret law is justified-and best understood-not as a form of traditional
property, contract, tort, or other extension of existing common law principles,
but rather as intellectual property.2 29 Trade secrets are best understood as
intellectual property rights because they not only promote inventive activity
(i.e., by encouraging invention in areas where patent law does not reach), but
they also encourage broader disclosure and use of information.230
The "incentives to disclose" rationale is not limited to trade secret law;
commentators refer to it as an underlying purpose of other IP laws, notably
patent. Patent law, for example, requires that an applicant describe her
invention in sufficient detail so that one ordinarily skilled in the field can make
it, and that the information be published. 231 Thus, anyone can read the patent,
including other inventors who can use the information to improve or design
around the invention. What is interesting, however, about the disclosure
rationale in the context of trade secret law is that it is not premised on
publication of a secret, and it appears to have greater significance in relation to
incentives to create. That is, the incentives-to-create rationale has an exalted
place in the patent context232 that it does not seem to have in the trade secret
context-or at least, it is more controversial in the trade secret context. Some
scholars, like Michael Risch, have gone so far as to say that, unlike in the
patent or copyright contexts, incentives to create has a "very minor" place in
providing a justification for trade secret law.233
Court embraced the tort theory of trade secret in a famous, early twentieth century case, E.I. du Pont de
Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917). In that case, the Court viewed as the "starting
point" of the offense not the plaintiffs ownership of a property right (i.e., the Court did not focus on
whether the information qualified as a trade secret), but rather the defendant's acquisition of information
through his "confidential relations with the plaintiffs." Id. at 102. More recently, however, the Supreme
Court embraced a property view of trade secrets in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03
(1984). The Court held that a federal law requiring Monsanto to publicly disclose its trade secrets was a
Fifth Amendment taking of private property that merited compensation. For a criticism of the property
view advanced in this decision, see Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and
Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 365, 366
(1989).
228. Bone, supra note 131, at 245 ("[T]rade secret law is merely a collection of other legal
norms-contract, fraud, and the like-united only by the fact that they are used to protect secret
information."). Bone concludes that trade secret law is "parasitic"-i.e., it depends on some other "host
theory" (e.g., contract law, theft, or the like) for normative support. Because it is parasitic, "trade secret
law should not be expanded beyond the limits of its host theories." Id. at 245-46.
229. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 330-33.
230. See id.
231. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 122(b) (2006). In addition, patent law discourages secrecy in other
ways, for example, by requiring prompt filing once an inventor starts using the invention. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (2006). See Lemley, supra note 12, at 332 for a description of the ways in which patent law
encourages disclosure and discourages secrecy.
232. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECi. 401, 426 (2010) (arguing that the focus in patent law is rightly on inducing
innovation rather than disclosure).
233. Risch, supra note 131, at 26; see also Bone, supra note 131, at 272 (noting that while trade
secret law might enhance incentives to create certain kinds of technological information-e.g.,
intermediate results of an ongoing research project-it is less clear whether trade secret law is needed to
encourage the creation of a wide range of nontechnological information that is currently protectable as
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What, then, is the role of incentives to disclose in justifying trade secret
protection? After all, the protection of trade secrets seems, at first glance, to cut
in precisely the opposite direction (since the right is conditioned on relative
secrecy). Lemley argues that "paradoxically . . . trade secret law actually
encourages broader disclosure and use of information, not secrecy." It achieves
this purpose in two ways.234
First, the legal protection provided by trade secret law reduces
overinvestment in secrecy, which is "a real problem" absent trade secret
protection.235 Overinvestment may take the form of increased physical
investments, like walls and fences,236 or business decisions that restrict the flow
of information between potential partners or new employees. Though the
empirical evidence is far from perfect (as is often the case when gauging the
real world effects of laws), it suggests that absent effective trade secret
protection, companies "may be less willing to contract . . . production out to
third parties if it means giving out information about secret processes, even
where the third party could use the process more efficiently."237
Alternatively, companies may impose limits on employee mobility or
"hire employees whom they expect to be loyal-such as family members-
rather than strangers who would do a better job."238 Such restrictions on the
flow of information may impede the improvement and commercialization of
inventions based on secret information and "therefore interfere with both the
invention and disclosure functions of IP law."239 The fact that trade secret law
reduces rather than increases a firm's investment in secrecy "answers many of
the objections people have offered to trade secret law."240
Lemley identifies a second way that trade secret laws encourage
trade secret-e.g, market studies, long-term business plans, and customer lists-since "a firm must have
a marketing plan and must compile financial data in any event, if it is to compete effectively"); Risch,
supra note 198, at 4-17 (arguing that it is difficult to determine whether it is trade secret law that
encourages an incentive to create or the underlying availability of secrecy through self-help
mechanisms). Of course, some scholars and commentators do point to "incentives to create" as the key
animating rationale of trade secret law. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 244 (1981); see
also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482, 484 (1974) (acknowledging trade secret law's
role in encouraging invention-along with other non-incentive based values, such as privacy and
commercial morality).
234. Lemley, supra note 12, at 333.
235. Id. at 334 ("Examples can be found as far back as the guild system .... [I]n the absence of
legal means to protect [technical] knowledge [guilds] went to great lengths to prevent others from
learning of it, imposing draconian limits on the mobility of employees."). Similarly, Michael Risch
observes, "[T]he primary benefit of trade secret law is the decrease in both the amount spent on
protecting secrets and the amount spent by those who seek to learn them." Risch, supra note 131, at 26;
see also Lichtman, supra note 167, at 230 (suggesting that trade secret law serves to "displace
particularly wasteful forms of self-help").
236. Recalling the Christopher (aerial photograph) case, in a world without trade secret,
DuPont might have built a temporary roof over its plant during construction to avoid competitors' aerial
spying. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
237. Lemley, supra note 12, at 335.
238. Id. at 333.
239. Id. at 335.
240. Id. at 337. Bone, however, seems to question this particular benefit of trade secret law and
suggests that this argument "ignores enforcement costs and underestimates the transaction costs of
licensing, both of which are likely to be especially high when secret information is involved." Bone,
supra note 131, at 273.
415
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 36: 371
disclosure: by serving as a partial solution to Arrow's Information Paradox.241
That is, in the absence of adequate legal protection, the developer of a
potentially valuable but secret idea will have a hard time selling it to someone
who could make better use of it. This is because in order to sell the idea, he has
to disclose it, but disclosing it destroys the value inherent in its secrecy.242 A
trade secret right, which prevents the other party from disclosing or using the
idea in breach of a confidential relationship, allows the idea-holder to negotiate
freely:
The law, by giving certain rights to the holder of the secret, allows him to
disclose information he would otherwise have been unwilling to share, and
therefore permits business negotiations that can lead to commercialization of
the invention or sale of the idea, serving both the disclosure and incentive
functions of IP law.243
This result would be difficult to attain with contract law alone, as a putative
buyer would be reluctant to sign a contract limiting her rights to use
information without knowing the content of the information.244 In effect,
"Trade secret law reaches beyond contract law by allowing courts to infer the
existence of a confidential relationship from circumstances in which
transactions might be difficult or impossible without that assumption." 245 Thus,
while a world in which companies freely disclosed their information would be
ideal, on balance, trade secret law fosters some measure of trust between
negotiating parties and employers and employees, reduces the building of walls
and fences around information, and encourages sharing of the secret to more
people who can help make productive use of it.24 6
B. Applying the Insights of Trade Secret Law To Construct an IP
Theory of Traditional Knowledge
The relationship between intellectual property law, secrecy, and
disclosure has important consequences for the traditional knowledge debate. In
the traditional knowledge context too, society as a whole benefits from the
disclosure of commercially valuable information. If bark from a tree and a
shaman's knowledge of its special properties can cure ulcers, then society has
an interest in encouraging the disclosure of this knowledge to other entities that
can improve upon it and bring it to the larger public.
At least some anecdotal evidence suggests that traditional knowledge
holders are willing to share otherwise secret information with outsiders for
research and commercial purposes, so long as they are afforded a degree of
control over subsequent uses of the knowledge and, in some cases, a portion of
241. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
NAT'L BUREAU OF EcoN. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIvE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (1962) (arguing that in the absence of legal protection, sellers will not
disclose information to buyers, and buyers will be unable to value it).
242. Lemley, supra note 12, at 332.
243. Id. at 336-37.
244. Id. at 337.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 353.
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the benefit. For example, traditional healers from indigenous communities in
Uganda reported to WIPO IGC field researchers that they would be "willing to
collaborate with modem health practitioners and the pharmaceutical industry to
share information," but that "[p]rotective measures should be in place before
[they] would be willing to collaborate with outsiders." 247
Evidence also suggests that in the absence of protection, traditional
knowledge holders are warier of sharing and, in some cases, will go to great
lengths to erect walls around potentially valuable information. A number of
traditional knowledge holders interviewed during the course of the WIPO
IGC's nine fact-finding missions expressed an unwillingness to share their
traditional knowledge out of fear that they would not have any control over the
way the information was used or derive any economic benefits. Members of the
Kuna community in Panama, for example, expressed their aversion toward
collaborating with ethnobotanists or other scientists:
Expeditions by [these researchers] have started to be regarded with suspicion
because community members are not involved in, nor informed of, the
subsequent use of the information and biological material supplied by them. It
is believed that if new products were to be developed or new scientific
publications issued on the basis of that information, the communities of origin
would probably never be informed and would in all likelihood not participate in
any economic benefits deriving therefrom.248
Some local and indigenous groups have taken more drastic steps to
prevent the flow of information to outsiders. In 2000, a Wapishana indigenous
community in the Guyanese Amazon banned all "researchers" from entering
their villages.249 This community had previously shared valuable medicinal
information with a British chemist about the healing powers of certain plants-
Tipir, the nut of the Greenheart tree, and Cunani, a bush plant-used since
ancient times. The chemist subsequently obtained U.S. and European patents
based on the active ingredients in these plants, which he claimed were useful in
treating malaria and preventing heart blockages. The community viewed the
incident as a betrayal of their sharing.250 In response, they have banned the
research efforts of all outsiders-to the potential detriment of society. Thus,
even if an initial transmission of information-like the chemist's initial
acquisition of knowledge-can occur in the absence of traditional knowledge
protection, the erosion of trust from such a one-sided transaction can pollute
future transmissions.251
To be sure, formal law's role in lessening distrust may operate differently
in the commercial context than in the traditional knowledge context, depending
on the level of social or cultural significance that such knowledge may have for
247. WIPO FACT-FINDING MISSIONS REPORT, supra note 141, at 87.
248. Id at 137.
249. MARY RILEY, INDIGENOUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: LEGAL OBSTACLES AND
INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS 114 (2004).
250. Id; see also Someshwar Singh, Indigenous Community Bans TNC Researchers, THIRD
wORLD NETWORK (Feb. 24, 2000), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/bans.htm.
251. See Heald, supra note 1, at 536 (noting that "if initial deals are perceived to be
exploitative, trust will erode").
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a particular community or the community's level of wariness toward outsiders.
Information sharing in the traditional knowledge context may require greater
indicia of respect or trustworthiness than the arms-length commercial licensing
transactions that govern information sharing for modem firms. As Rosemary
Coombe writes, "Acquiring traditional knowledge . . . may require rather
different forms of social relationship that involve trust [and] collaboration," as
well as a showing of "respect that our intellectual property laws . . . do little to
encourage."252
Here, too, a fair amount of variation is likely to exist among and between
groups. But what is striking about the data collected by the WIPO IGC is that a
number of traditional knowledge holders have voiced a greater willingness to
share knowledge and collaborate upon receiving internationally recognized IP
rights. And experimental projects such as Ecociencia's closed-access registry of
botanical knowledge suggest trade secret law's potential for eliciting hitherto
unknown and undisclosed traditional knowledge and encouraging its
categorization, classification, and storage in forms that can be more easily
shared with outsiders. 253
Even outside of the traditional knowledge context, the effects of formal
law on trust and behavior are difficult to measure in any absolute terms; its role
is often "modest but [nonetheless] important." 254 As Dagan and Heller observe:
The myriad details of the law do not matter individually, but jointly they
produce practices and experiences that in turn generate social expectations. For
law to affect behavior, we do not assume widespread knowledge of any
doctrinal detail, only that people generally believe that if things turn ugly, the
law will serve as one form of social organization that protects them against
extreme abuse and exploitation. 255
Thus, while the evidence may be limited, there are both logical and
evidentiary reasons to suggest that without legal protection, traditional
knowledge holders would disclose less and take more assertive steps to prevent
the flow of information to outsiders. This is problematic for a number of
reasons, including that it will "slow the process of commercialization and
improvement of' relatively secret knowledge and ultimately interfere with
"both the invention and disclosure functions of IP law." 256 For example,
researchers might be prevented from entering these communities at all, or even
if they did enter, traditional knowledge holders might be unwilling to share
information that could lead to the next antimalarial or heart medicine.
The role of intellectual property law in facilitating trust and cooperation
252. Rosemary J. Coombe, Protecting Cultural Industries To Promote Cultural Diversity:
Dilemmas for International Policymaking Posed by the Recognition of Traditional Knowledge, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 2, at 599, 602.
253. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing the Ecociencia trade secret project).
254. Dagan & Heller, supra note 162, at 579.
255. Id. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between contract law and the
promotion of socially beneficial trust, see Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory
Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 905 (1985) (describing
the underlying legal policy of promissory estoppel as "protect[ing] the ability of individuals to trust
promises in circumstances in which that trust is socially beneficial").
256. Lemley, supra note 12, at 335.
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in the traditional knowledge context merits additional research and
investigation. Trade secret law-and more specifically, a clarification of TRIPS
Article 39's commercial value requirement and a richer understanding of the
intersection of reasonable secrecy efforts and customary law in the traditional
knowledge context 25-may, in the end, comprise only part of a broader
package of useful policy reforms.258 My purpose here is not to suggest that
trade secret law is the only desirable path. Rather, I seek to illuminate the ways
in which trade secret law can protect a subset of traditional knowledge and help
frame the international discussion in a more fruitful way-a way that
emphasizes important connections between traditional knowledge protection
and the broader purposes of intellectual property, instead of merely its
divisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
For over a decade, the issue of traditional knowledge protection has posed
an intractable problem for advocates, scholars, and developing country
governments. Traditional knowledge advocates seek greater recognition and
rights within international intellectual property law-particularly, the muscular
TRIPS framework. But thus far, they have failed to effectively link their
arguments to the IP framework or the broader purposes of existing IP regimes.
Instead, traditional knowledge advocates have operated primarily within
"human rights" and "preservation" approaches. These approaches appear more
hospitable to traditional knowledge advocates than the conventional IP
approach, especially given the latter's focus on ex ante "incentives to create."
But the conventional IP approach need not be so narrow.
I have argued that trade secret law is useful to the traditional knowledge
debate in two underexamined ways. First, a trade secret approach to traditional
knowledge protection is a practical initial step forward in the international
impasse. Trade secret law can be a useful legal vehicle for traditional
knowledge holders when dealing with outsiders' improper acquisition,
disclosure, and use of relatively secret information. Admittedly, many
traditional knowledge holders may view trade secret law as too limited-too
fragile-because it does not apply to publicly available, reverse-engineered, or
independently developed information. While I am sympathetic to such
concerns, this Article takes a decidedly pragmatic approach; more idealized
approaches that significantly undercut the purposes of existing intellectual
property regimes are less likely to be accepted within the framework of
257. See supra Sections IV.C, IV.D.
258. While fleshing out the contours of a "trade secrecy plus" regime is beyond the scope of
this paper, certain policy mechanisms might effectively be used in conjunction with trade secret law. For
example, Jerome Reichman and Tracy Lewis have suggested a "compensatory liability regime" (CLR).
See Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules To Stimulate Local Innovation in
Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra
note 2, at 337. Under this proposal, an indigenous group's authorized representative would voluntarily
register traditional know-how in a CLR database; in return, the group would receive short-term legal
protection during which all uses by second comers would be compensated. Id. Nonetheless, traditional
holders would not be able to control particular uses of the knowledge by second comers. Id.
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international IP law and enforced by the international community. Absent a
model for protection that incorporates some objective limits and preserves
access to generally available information, "an international approach is likely to
be a more abstract gesture" than a reality. 2 59
In addition to outlining trade secret law's practical possibilities in the
traditional knowledge arena, I have argued that trade secret law can serve as a
normative guide to help ground an IP theory of traditional knowledge
protection. One prominent justification for trade secret law's inclusion in the IP
law family is that it serves the "disclosure" purposes of IP law by reducing
holders' over-investment in secrecy, lessening distrust, and encouraging the
disclosure of valuable information to those who can improve or make more
productive use of it. Similarly, traditional knowledge protection may lessen the
distrust of indigenous and local communities toward outsiders and encourage
their disclosure of valuable information in socially beneficial ways.
259. Taubman, supra note 23, at 558.
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